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JUSTICE KENNEDY AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
PROPERTY, STATES' RIGHTS, AND A PERSISTENT

SEARCH FOR NEXUS
Michael C. Blumm* & Sherry L. Bosse**
Abstract: Justice Anthony Kennedy, now clearly the pivot of the Roberts Court, is the
Court's crucial voice in environmental law cases. Kennedy's central role was never more
evident than in the two most celebrated environmental cases of the last few years, Kelo v.
City of New London and Rapanos v. United States, as he supplied the critical vote in both.
Kennedy has in fact been the needle of the Supreme Court's environmental law compass
since his nomination in 1988. Although he wrote surprisingly few environmental law
opinions over his first eighteen years on the Court, Kennedy was in the majority an
astonishing ninety-six percent of the time (as compared to his generic record of being in the
majority slightly over sixty percent of the time). This article examines Kennedy's
environmental law record on the Court, as well as his preceding thirteen years on the Ninth
Circuit. The article evaluates all of the environmental law cases in which he wrote an opinion
over those three decades and catalogues his voting record in all Supreme Court cases in
which he participated. One striking measure of Kennedy's influence is that he has written just
one environmental dissent while on the Court, and that was on states' rights grounds, one of
his chief priorities. We believe that Kennedy is considerably more interested in allowing trial
judges to resolve cases on the basis of context than in establishing broadly-applicable
doctrine. That is, he is a doctrinal minimalist. By consistently demanding a demonstrated
"nexus" between doctrine and facts, he has shown an intolerance for elevating abstract
philosophy over concrete justice. And, despite his unassailable devotion to states' rights,
Kennedy has been quite willing to find federal preemption when it serves deregulation
purposes. On the other hand, he is far from an anti-regulatory zealot, although he prefers only
one level of governmental regulation. At what might be close to the mid-point in his Court
career-and with his power perhaps at its zenith-Justice Kennedy is clearly not someone
any litigant can ignore. We hope this article gives both environmental litigants and academics
a fertile resource to till. Although Kennedy's environmental record has been sparse until
lately, he may be receptive to environmental claims if they are factually well-grounded and
do not conflict with his overriding concern for states' rights. The article concludes with some
comparisons between Kennedy and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.
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Justice Kennedy and the Environment
INTRODUCTION
That Justice Anthony Kennedy sits at the center of the Roberts Court
is hardly a secret.' After the retirement of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,

Supreme Court advocates know they must aim their arguments at
Kennedy,

who

seldom

finds

himself

in

the

minority.2

In

the

1. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, Justices Drawn Into Global Warming Debate, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 4,
2006 (discussing, presciently, Kennedy's pivotal role in Massachusetts v.EPA, _U.S.- (Apr. 2,
2007), 127 S. Ct 1438 (2007), concerning the Environmental Protection Agency's authority to
regulate carbon dioxide emissions under the Clean Air Act); Posting of Lyle Denniston to
SCOTUSblog,
Analysis:
Kennedy
Key
To
Global
Warming
Challenge,
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2006/ 1/26-week (Nov. 29, 2006, 11:34). After
this article was in press, the Supreme Court finished its 2006 term, in which Justice Kennedy was
the deciding vote in all twenty-four of the Court's five-member majority decisions. Posting of Jason
Harrow
to
SCOTUSbIog,
Justice
Kennedy's
Remarkable
OT06,
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2007/06/justice-kennedy- .html (June 28, 2007,
5:20).
Kennedy was President Reagan's third nominee to replace Justice Lewis Powell, after the Senate
rejected Robert Bork and after Douglas Ginsburg withdrew, following revelations that he used
marijuana. Kennedy, who had served on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals since his appointment
by President Ford in 1975, was confirmed unanimously in February 1988. Kennedy owed his
appointment to a longstanding relationship with Ed Meese, Reagan's Chief of Staff and Attorney
General. Kennedy graduated from Stanford University in 1958 and Harvard Law School in 1961.
He then practiced law in Sacramento, where he also taught constitutional law at McGeorge School
of Law and worked with Meese on several projects, including a failed initiative to cut taxes and
spending that was supported by Governor Reagan. See Oyez - Anthony Kennedy,
http://www.oyez.org/justices/anthony-kennedy/ (last visited June 29, 2007).
Unlike several of his colleagues on the Supreme Court, Kennedy never was a judicial clerk,
entering private practice after graduation in San Francisco (1961-1963) and Sacramento
(1963-1975). He taught constitutional law at McGeorge School of Law from 1965 until he was
confirmed as a Supreme Court Justice in 1988. See Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute,
Supreme Court Collection, http://www.law.comell.edu/supct/justices/kennedy.bio.html (last visited
June 29, 2007).
A recent assessment of Kennedy's jurisprudence challenged the widespread view that Kennedy is
an indecisive justice: "From the beginning, Kennedy's performance on the Court has been defined
not by indecision but by self-dramatizing utopianism. He believes it is the role of the Court in
general and himself in particular to align the messy reality of American life with an inspiring and
highly abstracted set of ideals." Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Leader - The Arrogance of Justice
Anthony Kennedy, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 18, 2007, at 17 (also characterizing Kennedy as "the
most activist" current justice, voting "to strike down more state and federal laws combined than any
of his colleagues," and labeling his jurisprudence as "a series of moralistic abstractions about
liberty, equality, and dignity").
2. Of the eighty environmental decisions Justice Kennedy participated in that we considered in
this study, he voted with the majority a remarkable seventy-seven times, or ninety-six percent of the
time. See infra Appendix A case table. (These statistics include cases in which Justice Kennedy
concurred in the judgment only, or in which he concurred in part and dissented in part.) Kennedy is
a much better barometer of the Court's environmental thinking than he is in all cases: during his
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environmental field (which we define to include natural resources and
land use law), Justice Kennedy's pivotal role was cemented by his recent
opinions in the Kelo v. City of New London3 and Rapanos v. United
States4 cases, where he cast the deciding votes.5 While Kennedy's role in
those cases has received quite a bit of commentary,6 there is no

first eighteen years on the Court, Kennedy dissented a total of 354 times out of the 874 decisions in
which he took part, or 40.5 percent of the time.
Justice Kennedy's record for voting with the majority in close decisions further illustrates his
pivotal role at the Court's center: Kennedy voted with the majority in eighty percent of the
environmental cases included in this survey that were decided with a 5-4 vote. Of the eighty cases in
this survey, fifteen rested on majority opinions joined by just five members of the Court. See infra
Appendix A case table. Kennedy voted with the dissent in just three of these decisions. See Alaska
Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004), discussed infra notes 187-203 and
accompanying text; Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), discussed infra notes 48-50
and accompanying text; and Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001), discussed infra note 100.
Two additional decisions rested on Justice Kennedy's decision to provide the crucial fifth vote in
the judgment only, but to write a separate concurrence in each case. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524
U.S. 498 (1998), discussed infra notes 101-106 and accompanying text; Rapanos v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng'rs,
U.S.
(June 19, 2006), 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006), discussed infra notes 240-254
and accompanying text. In another case, Borden Ranch P'ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs., 537
U.S. 99 (2002), an equally divided Court affirmed a Ninth Circuit's decision after Justice Kennedy
removed himself from the case.
By the end of the first term for the Roberts Court, several commentators had recognized
Kennedy's newly pivotal role, alone, at the Court's center. See Dahlia Lithwick, A Supreme Court
of One, WASH. POST, Jul. 2, 2006, at BI (discussing Kennedy's emergence as the swing vote on the
Roberts Court and the controlling effect of his opinion in Rapanos); Linda Greenhouse, Roberts Is
at Court's Helm, But He Isn't Yet in Control, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 2, 2006, at Al (placing Kennedy
both literally and figuratively at Court's center for the regularity in which he cast the deciding vote
in split decisions in the Roberts Court's first term).
3. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
4.

-U.S.-

(June 19, 2006), 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).

5. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484 (joining the opinion Justice Stevens wrote for the 5-4 majority
upholding a city's decision to use its eminent domain power to condemn developed land for an
economic development project because it fulfilled the "public use" requirement of the Fifth
Amendment); infra notes 234-237 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's Kelo
concurrence); Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2236 (providing the critical fifth vote for the majority
when he concurred in the judgment). Kennedy refused to join Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in
Rapanos, instead writing a separate concurrence that has more in common with Justice Stevens's
dissent than with Scalia's opinion. See infra notes 247-254 and accompanying text (discussing
Kennedy's concurrence).
6. See Brent Nicholson & Sue Ann Mota, From Public Use to Public Purpose: The Supreme
Court Stretches the Takings Clause in Kelo v. City of New London, 41 GONz. L. REV. 81, 98
(2005) (discussing Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Kelo and the public use doctrine); Orlando E.
Delogu, Kelo v. City of New London-Wrongly Decided and a Missed Opportunityfor Principled
Line Drawing with Respect to Eminent Domain Takings, 58 ME. L. REv. 18, 42-46 (2006)
(advocating the more stringent standard of review for eminent domain in economic revitalization
projects that Justice Kennedy's Kelo concurrence suggested). Kelo prompted a vocal and
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systematic assessment of his entire environmental record.7 In this article,
we aim to provide that assessment by evaluating all of Justice Kennedy's
environmental opinions, including those he wrote during the thirteen
years he served 8on the Ninth Circuit before his 1988 appointment to the
Supreme Court.
One remarkable aspect of the Kennedy environmental law record is
just how little there is of it. In a judicial career spanning more than three
decades, Justice Kennedy has written only twenty-one opinions that can
be characterized as within our broad definition of environmental law:
twelve majority opinions, eight concurrences, and just one dissent. 9

widespread backlash, discussed infra note 227.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Rapanos generated a considerable amount of commentary in
the press. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Divided on Protections Over Wetlands, N.Y. TIMES, Jun.
20, 2006, at AI (suggesting Kennedy's "significant nexus" may be the standard the Army Corps of
Engineers adopts if it undertakes rulemaking to define its wetlands jurisdiction); Warren Richey,
High Court Splits Over Protecting Wetlands, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jun. 20, 2006, at USA I
(discussing how Justice Kennedy's interpretation of "significant nexus" will allow for a greater
degree of Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands than Scalia advocated in Rapanos); Charlie Tebbutt,
Op-Ed, Ruling Befouls Clean Water Efforts, EUGENE REGISTER-GUARD, Aug. 20, 2006, at Fl
(discussing the Rapanos decision and criticizing Kennedy's opinion for "mudd[ying] the waters" of
wetlands jurisdiction); David G. Savage, D~ji Vu Once Again: Despite New Faces on the Supreme
Court, Term's Ending Is Familiar, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2006, at 12 (discussing how Justice Kennedy's
seat alone at the Court's center made his vote the deciding factor in a number of prominent
decisions, including Rapanos, during the Roberts Court's first term); DOJ Plan for Dual Wetlands
Jurisdiction Test Wins Cautious Backing, 15 WATER POLICY REP., no. 16, Aug. 7, 2006 (discussing
the U.S. Department of Justice's decision to use either Justice Kennedy's or Justice Scalia's tests to
determine wetlands jurisdiction post-Rapanos); William W. Buzbee, Interpreting the Effect of the
U.S. Supreme Court's Recent Decision in the Joint Cases of Rapanos v. United States and Carabell
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng rs., Testimony Before the Committee on Senate Environment & Public
Works Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife and Water, Aug. I, 2006 (transcript available at
http://epw.senate.gov/public/109th/Buzbee_.Testimony.pdf) (describing Justice Kennedy's opinion
as the "key" to the Court's ruling in Rapanos).
7. Richard Lazarus has, however, supplied a (now somewhat dated) assessment of the Supreme
Court's environmental record as a whole. Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental
About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REv. 703, 812 (2000) (rating Justice
Kennedy's environmental record as 25.9 percent, prior to 1998) [hereinafter Lazarus,
Environmental Law in the Supreme Court]. See also Richard J. Lazarus, Environmental Law and the
Supreme Court: Three Years Later, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 653, 673 (2002). Lazarus's analytical
data has been more recently updated by Jonathan Cannon, in his cultural analysis of the Supreme
Court's environmental opinions. In that study, according to Cannon, Justice Kennedy raised his
environmental record to 34.1 percent. Jonathan Cannon, Environmentalism and the Supreme Court:
A Cultural Analysis, 33 ECOLOGY L. Q. 363, 441 (2006) (updating the environmental scores for the
justices sitting on the current Court with data from recent environmental opinions as part of a
cultural analysis of the Supreme Court's environmental opinions).
8. See supra note 1.
9. Justice Kennedy has voted on many more decisions than these, but we believe those cases in
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Although Justice Kennedy has been an active participant in the Supreme0
Court's decisions concerning alleged regulatory takings of property,'
aside from those cases, he has not seemed very invested in
environmental issues, at least when they involve statutory
interpretation." Kennedy perhaps broke this apparent disinterest in his
decisive concurrence in Rapanos, where he refused to restrict federal
jurisdiction over wetlands to relatively permanent or continuously
flowing bodies of water, instead opting to uphold federal jurisdiction
wherever there was "a significant nexus" between a wetland and a
navigable water. 2
Even if Justice Kennedy's Rapanos opinion does not signal a change
in his interest in environmental issues, he remains the indispensable vote
on the Court. Richard Lazarus has pointed out that Kennedy has an

which he wrote opinions are the best reflections of his judicial disposition. At any rate, analyzing
his opinions is much more telling than guessing at his silences. In Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S.
498, 542 (1998), Kennedy concurred in part, dissented in part. See infra notes 101-106 and
accompanying text. This article counts that decision as a concurrence.
10. See Kelo, 545 U.S. 469, 493 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing for heightened
scrutiny for the use of eminent domain when the public use at issue is economic development);
Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (joining Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion repudiating the court's use of the substantive due process "substantially advances"
test in takings cases, but writing separately to highlight the possibility that some regulations "might
be so arbitrary or irrational as to violate due process"); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,
628 (holding that the fact that a landowner acquired his property after enactment of the challenged
regulations did not automatically bar the landowner's regulatory takings claim if a previous owner
could not take the steps to make the claim ripe, although this result was tempered by the conclusion
the landowner had not been deprived of all economic value of his property); City of Monterey v.
Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 694 (1999) (approving the use of jury
determinations in a regulatory takings case); Apfel, 524 U.S. at 542 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(refusing to apply takings analysis to retroactive legislation); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1034-35 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing for a standard based on a
landowner's reasonable expectations, which would also take into account environmental factors);
see also infra notes 296-313 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Kennedy's role in the
Court's decisions in takings cases).
Eastern and Lingle both involved takings claims that did not occur in the context of land use
decisions. Eastern addressed the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act, 524 U.S. 498, discussed
infra notes 101-106, while Lingle involved an oil company challenge to whether a Hawai'i statute
limiting rent oil companies could charge service stations, 544 U.S. 528, discussed infra notes 215226. While not strictly environmental, both cases were included in this study because takings cases
have such a profound impact on environmental law.
11. Our colleague, Craig Johnston, Professor of Law at Lewis and Clark Law School, pointed this
fact out to us.
12. Rapanos v. United States, U.S. (June 19, 2006), 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2236 (2006) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
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"astounding record" for being in the majority in environmental cases. 13
Even when he does not write an opinion, Kennedy is often the pivotal
environmental vote. For example, in the Court's recent decision granting
standing to a coalition of states challenging the Environmental
Protection Agency's refusal to regulate carbon emission under the Clean
Air Act, it was a Kennedy suggestion at oral argument that supplied the
reasoning adopted by Justice Stevens's majority opinion. 14 Of the eighty
Supreme Court environmental opinions considered for the purposes of
this article, Justice Kennedy was in the majority an astonishing seventyseven times, or ninety-six percent of the time. 5 Advocates in
environmental cases must tailor their arguments to win his vote or risk
losing their appeals. There is thus much to be gained by carefully
examining the Kennedy environmental record, for it may 6very well
portend the future of environmental law in the Roberts Court.'

13. Lazarus, EnvironmentalLaw in the Supreme Court, supra note 7, at 714 (noting that Kennedy
was in the majority in 56 of 57 cases decided between 1988 and 2000).
l4. Massachusetts v. EPA, U.S_ (Apr. 2, 2007), 127 S. Ct 1438 (2007); see infra note 74 and
accompanying text.
15. See infra Appendix A (displaying tabular data of the Court's environmental decisions during
Kennedy's tenure). We are indebted to Richard Lazarus, whose methodology in selecting cases for
his analysis of the Court's environmental opinions influenced our methodology for selecting the
cases used in this study of Justice Kennedy's environmental opinions. See Lazarus, Environmental
Law in the Supreme Court, supra note 7, at 708 (explaining the reasoning behind selecting cases to
include in his study of the Court's environmental opinions). We employed similar criteria to select
additional cases in which the environment or natural resources are at stake in the decision, including
boundary disputes between states and cases involving areas of the law with a fundamental effect on
jurisdictional issues in federal environmental laws, such as the Eleventh Amendment, Fifth
Amendment takings, and Commerce Clause authority.
16. At the beginning of the second term for the Roberts Court, a large number of commentators
perceived Justice Kennedy as the most influential vote on the Court in a variety of areas, including
the environment. See Editorial: The Kennedy Court? One Man with Caprice Makes a Majority,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2006, at A6 (noting the disproportionate attention being paid to Justice
Kennedy at the start of the Court's 2006 term as a symptom of his newfound prominence alone at
the Court's center); Warren Richey, Will the Supreme Court Shackle New Tribunal Law?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 17, 2006, at USAI (discussing Justice Kennedy's emerging role as
the crucial vote in national security cases, as well as in decisions involving a number of other "hotbutton social issues"); Warren Richey, For Supreme Court's New Term: Rise of a New Centrist,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 2, 2006, at USA2 (speculating on how Kennedy's newly prominent
role at the Court's center may influence a number of key decisions during the 2006-2007 term);
Gregory Stanford, A High Court Tilts and Your Rights Get Squashed, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jul.
30, 2006, at J4 (describing Justice Kennedy's centrist stance as the "saving grace" of the Roberts
Court's first term); Morning Edition: A Newly Conservative Supreme Court? (National Public
Radio broadcast, Oct. 2, 2006) (identifying social issues on which Kennedy assumes a more
conservative stance than Justice O'Connor's centrist views); Bill Mears, Justice Kennedy Works on
His Swing, CNN, Sept. 29, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/09/25/scotus.kennedy/index.html
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This article maintains that Kennedy is best characterized as a
contextualist, attached to case-by-case fact-finding that links context to
legal standards. His devotion to a nexus between facts and rules,
especially evident in his standing opinions,' 7 also dominated his recent
interpretation of the scope of federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water
Act.18 Kennedy is also committed to states' rights. He was part of the
Rehnquist Court majority that created the first limits on the federal
commerce power in sixty years,' 9 and that announced significant state

(discussing Justice Kennedy's pivotal role as the Court's "man in the middle" in several divisive
social issues).
17. Justice Kennedy, writing for a five member majority in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes
at Monterey, Ltd., upheld a district court decision to submit a takings claim to a jury but rejected the
more stringent "rough proportionality" test as a means of evaluating takings claims that do not
involve exactions for the purpose of dedicating private property to public use. 526 U.S. 687, 703
(1999), discussed infra notes 107-123. In his concurrence in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Serv., Inc., Justice Kennedy stood alone in suggesting that citizen suit provisions may
interfere with powers conferred on the Executive branch by Article II of the constitution. 528 U.S.
167, 197 (2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring), discussed infra notes 159-160. Nearly a decade earlier,
Kennedy disagreed with Justice Scalia's rejection of environmental plaintiff standing based on an
"animal or vocational nexus" in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, and instead wrote a separate
concurrence expressing his willingness to consider standing on that basis, should the Court be
presented with different facts. See 504 U.S. 555, 579 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring), discussed
infra notes 69-77. However, later in his Defenders concurrence, Kennedy appeared to question the
validity of standing under the citizen suit provision of the Endangered Species Act for its failure to
"establish that there is an injury in 'any person' by virtue of any 'violation"' of the statute. See id. at
580. As a member of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Kennedy wrote an opinion holding
that a plaintiff lacked standing in a Clean Water Act citizen suit. According to Kennedy, the injury
was not redressable by injunctive relief since the underlying purpose of the CWA citizen suit
provision-protecting clean water and the environment-was not served by the suit. Gonzales v.
Gorsuch, 688 F.2d 1263, 1267 (9th Cir. 1982), discussed infra notes 33-35.
18. See Rapanos v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs.,
U.S._ (June 19, 2006), 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2236
(2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (writing separately to advocate requiring a
"significant nexus" between a wetland and navigable waters to establish CWA jurisdiction over a
wetland); see infra notes 247-254.
19. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (joining the
Rehnquist majority invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act, a federal law prohibiting firearms
within 1000 feet of schools, because it overstepped the congressional Commerce Clause power, and
writing a separate concurrence to emphasize how the connection with interstate commerce was too
attenuated to justify federal interference with state police powers); Lawrence Lessig, Translating
Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SuP. CT. REv. 125, 131 (1995) (linking the Court's
backpedaling from New Deal-era interpretations of expansive Commerce Clause powers and its
decision placing limits on federal power in Lopez with earlier movements to federal power); Robert
F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 644-47 (1996) (discussing the
analytic approach the Court took in Lopez and its implications in other contexts); Donald H. Regan,
How to Think About the FederalCommerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez,
94 MICH. L. REv. 554, 565-67 (1995) (discussing Justice Kennedy's interpretation of the federal
power to use the Commerce Clause to regulate non-commercial activity in his concurrence in
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immunity from federal court suits in the Eleventh Amendment.2 0 And as
a professed property rights defender, Kennedy is a government planning
skeptic. 2 1 These doctrinal minimalist, states' rights, and property rights
sentiments do not always point in the same direction, making Kennedy's
jurisprudence especially interesting to examine.
This analysis of the Kennedy record on the environment is in
chronological order, beginning with Kennedy's tenure on the Ninth
Circuit, proceeding to his Supreme Court opinions prior to 2000, then

Lopez); Bradley A. Harsch, Brzonkala, Lopez, and the Commerce Clause Canard: A Synthesis of
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence,29 N.M. L. REV. 321, 326-328 (1999) (criticizing Lopez as an
under-inclusive test for Commerce Clause legislation).
20. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Rehnquist Court issued a series of opinions interpreting the
Eleventh Amendment to shield states from suits in a number of federal laws. In Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, a slim five-member majority opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
joined by Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas held that Congress could not use the
Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity in the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act. 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996). See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assumptions of
Federalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1763, 1774 (2006) (discussing the Rehnquist Court's Eleventh
Amendment decisions expanding state sovereign immunity); Robert L. Glicksman, From
Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy,
41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 764-65 (2006) (characterizing the Rehnquist Court's Eleventh
Amendment decisions as the source of the "most aggressive limitations" on federal legislative
power in recent decades); David Milton Whalin, John C. Calhoun Becomes the Tenth Justice: State
Sovereignty, Judicial Review, and Environmental Law After June 23, 1999, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
J. 193, 194-95 (2000) (comparing the Rehnquist Court's Eleventh Amendment revolution with the
"nullification doctrine," which asserted that states could nullify acts of Congress, a theory promoted
most prominently by John C. Calhoun, the slavery defender from South Carolina).
Justice Kennedy's prominence in this line of cases is demonstrated by his authorship of two
subsequent opinions for the same five-member majority expounding on Eleventh Amendment state
sovereign immunity. In Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe ofIdaho, Justice Kennedy held that the state
of Idaho was shielded from the tribe's suit by the Eleventh Amendment. 521 U.S. 261, 281 (1997),
discussed infra notes 87-100. Kennedy wrote for another five-member majority two years later in
Alden v. Maine, affirming a lower court dismissal of a suit that had been filed by probation officers
against their employer, the state of Maine, alleging that the state had violated the federal Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, on the grounds the suit was barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity. 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999).
The same five-member majority banded together yet again in Board of Trustees of University of
Alabama v. Garrett, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, holding that the Eleventh
Amendment shielded a state from lawsuits under a federal law, this time preventing former
employees of the state of Alabama from recovering damages from the state for its failure to comply
with Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001). The fivemember majority finally broke apart in the Court's 2003 decision in Nevada Department of Human
Resources v. Hibbs, when Chief Justice Rehnquist held that a state employee's suit against the state
for its failure to comply with the Family and Medical Leave Act was not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment because Congress had enacted the legislation using its Fourteenth Amendment power
to ameliorate past discrimination. Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined the
opinion, and Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas
dissented. 538 U.S. 721, 726, 744 (2003).
2 1. See infra note 26.
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examining his post-2000 decisions through 2004, and finally assessing
his pivotal role in the environmental decisions of 2005-2006. Section I
begins by discussing Judge Kennedy's Ninth Circuit environmental
opinions, of which there are only a few. Section II turns to Kennedy's
early years on the Supreme Court, from 1988 to 2000, including several
important decisions on standing, takings, and preemption. Section III
evaluates Kennedy's opinions during 2000-2004, highlighted by an
important majority opinion on takings and Kennedy's sole written
environmental dissent. Section IV examines the decisions of 2005-2006,
focusing on the Kelo, Rapanos, and Lingle v. Chevron22 decisions.2 3 In

section V, the article profiles Kennedy's contributions to discrete areas
of the law, including standing and ripeness, federalism, takings, and

statutory interpretation of environmental laws. The article concludes that
Kennedy is best characterized as a doctrinal minimalist, who is attached

to case-by-case fact-finding and to requiring fact-finders to show a
"nexus" between rules and context; 24 a states' rights advocate; 25 and a
property rights defender,
planning.26

I.

who is quite skeptical

of government

JUDGE KENNEDY ON THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Judge Kennedy's environmental record on the Ninth Circuit is sparse.
Appointed by President Ford in 1975, Kennedy wrote only four
environmental opinions in more than a dozen years. These decisions

22. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
23. On Kelo and Rapanos, see supra notes 5-6, infra notes 227-237, 244-254 and accompanying
text; on Lingle, see infra notes 215-226 and accompanying text.
24. Webster's defines "nexus" as "a connection, interconnection tie, link; a connected group or
series; a predicative relation or a construction consisting of grammatical elements either actually or
felt as so related." WEBSTER'S THIRD INT'L DICTIONARY 1524 (1986). For a discussion of the
"nexus" requirement in the context of standing, see Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?
Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries, " and Article 111, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163, 201 (1992) (noting that Justice
Kennedy indicated in Lujan that he might be willing to recognize standing based on some "nexus"
theory); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1432,
1452-58 (1988) (discussing the Court's use of a "nexus" requirement to restrict standing).
25. See Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004), discussed infra notes
187-203 and accompanying text.
26. See Robert A. Chaim, Justice Kennedy Inaugurates the Archie Hefner Memorial Lecture
Series, MCGEORGE MAG., 1991, at 10-11 (quoting Kennedy as remarking that "property provides
the structural vehicle through which we can protect ourselves against a blueprint for the future being
imposed by government.., ever hungry for self-aggrandizement").
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show Kennedy to be a relatively non-doctrinaire jurist, open to
considering environmental claims but hardly welcoming them.
Kennedy's first environmental opinion came in a 1980 decision that
overturned a lower court's rejection of a National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) challenge by a citizens' group to the Federal Highway
Administration's funding of a four-lane expansion on Highway 2,
27
outside of Glacier National Park in Montana. The lower court ruled
that the environmentalists' suit was barred by laches. However, a panel
led by Judge Kennedy reversed on the ground that the plaintiffs had not
actually delayed bringing suit for a decade because the project had been
expanded and final federal approval came some nine years after it was
first proposed in 1969.28 On the merits, Judge Kennedy concluded that
the government's Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on the project
was deficient because it failed to analyze the secondary effects of the
highway, and because it did not include an adequate range of
alternatives, such as improving the existing two-lane highway.29
Two years later, in another NEPA suit, Judge Kennedy affirmed a
lower court in a panel decision upholding a Department of Housing and
Urban Development determination not to prepare an EIS on 3a0
redevelopment plan that would displace local artists in San Francisco.
The plaintiffs alleged that displacing local artists would "irreparably
damage the cultural character of the area," but Judge Kennedy rejected
the notion that a significant effect on the cultural environment triggered
an EIS. Judge Kennedy also noted that the plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate a "causal nexus" between the redevelopment and any
significant cultural impact, the first of many Kennedy opinions
demanding "nexus. 31 This demand for the development of specific facts
sufficient to show a close fit between the conflict at issue and the
purpose of the environmental law would become characteristic of
Kennedy's environmental jurisprudence, culminating in his 2006
32
Rapanos opinion.
Another 1982 panel opinion written by Judge Kennedy affirmed a
lower court's rejection of a challenge to the Environmental Protection

27. Coal. for Canyon Pres. v. Bowers, 632 F.2d 774, 777-78 (9th Cir. 1980).
28. Id. at 780-81.
29. Id. at 784.
30. Goodman Group, Inc. v. Dishroom, 679 F.2d 182, 184 (9th Cir. 1982).
31. Id. at 184.
32. See infra notes 246-254 and accompanying text.
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Agency's funding of a wastewater treatment facility for purposes
allegedly unrelated to water pollution.33 Unlike the lower court, which
ruled that the Clean Water Act authorized the expenditures, Judge
Kennedy concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing because by the
time the suit was filed, the local government grantee had already spent
the money, and there was no guarantee of future funds.34 Thus,
injunctive relief would not redress the alleged injury, and the purpose of
the statute's citizen suit provision-to protect clean 35water and the
environment--could not be served by the plaintiffs suit.
In still another 1982 panel opinion, Judge Kennedy upheld an Oregon
district court's grant of a preliminary injunction preventing the Yakama
Tribe from harvesting Columbia River salmon. The State of Washington
sought the injunction in response to extremely low salmon counts at
Bonneville Dam in the spring of 1980.36 The tribe appealed the
injunction, which involved fisheries located on or near the Yakama
Reservation, on the ground that the lower court's fishing closure
extinguished the tribe's treaty fishing rights without protecting the
salmon.37 Although the 1980 spring chinook salmon run was over, the
Ninth Circuit panel ruled that the tribe's claim was not moot because, in
light of the ongoing nature of litigation over Indian treaty fishing rights,
the tribe had a "reasonable expectation" it could face a similar injunction
in the future.3 8 Further, the sovereign immunity and jurisdictional issues
the tribe raised were also likely to recur in the case.39

33. Gonzales v. Gorsuch, 688 F.2d 1263, 1264-1265 (9th Cir. 1982). This decision drew a
concurrence from Judge Wallace, who emphasized the distinction between constitutional and
prudential standing, maintaining that the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision eliminated
prudential standing barriers and gave standing to anyone who could meet Article Ill standing

requirements. Id. at 1269 (Wallace, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 1267 ("[N]othing in the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to ignore or
to test the conventional requisites ofjusticiability.").

35. Id. at 1266-68 (stating that "[the CWA's] grant of standing does not extend to a review of
appropriations where the review and any judicial decree would be ineffective to vindicate

environmental concerns").
36. United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009, 1011 (9th Cir. 1982). The 1980 injunction and the
ensuing litigation grew out of a suit filed by individual members of the Yakama Tribe in 1968 to
protect treaty fishing rights for Columbia Basin tribes, in which the tribe later intervened. Sohappy

v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969). The Yakama Tribe changed the spelling of its name from
"Yakima" in 1993, in order to reflect its historic spelling.
37. Oregon, 657 F.2d at 1012.

38. Id. at 1012 n.7.
39. Id. at 1012.
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Reaching the merits, Judge Kennedy rejected the tribe's sovereign
immunity defense, concluding that the tribe had waived its immunity
when it intervened in the original suit.40 He also rejected the tribe's
argument that the injunction against tribal fishing on reservation lands
violated its treaty rights .4n Kennedy reasoned that if states have the
ability to regulate treaty fishing to further conservation interests without
violating treaty rights, a federal court should have the same ability to do
so. 42 This deferential treatment of the State's position in this case was
hardly surprising for a states' rights advocate.
Judge Kennedy's few environmental decisions on the Ninth Circuit
were not those of an ideological jurist. He was not noticeably hostile to
environmental claims, although he was hardly an enthusiast. He
produced remarkably few environmental opinions during a dozen years
on the court, a harbinger of his early years on the Supreme Court.
II.

EARLY YEARS ON THE SUPREME COURT, 1988-2000

Justice Kennedy's first dozen years on the Supreme Court were
marked first by acquiescence to the opinions of his colleagues, then by
two significant concurrences that revealed Kennedy to possess a
significantly different approach to environmental issues than, for
example, Justice Scalia. n3 He also displayed a surprising willingness to
preempt state statutes to avoid perceived overregulation,4 4 as well as a
nuanced approach to landowner claims for compensation to remedy
alleged regulatory takings.45

40. Id. at 1014. In addition to intervening in the original suit, the tribe had entered into an
agreement with the State of Washington in 1977, in which both the tribe and the state consented to
resolve any disputes over Columbia River salmon management in Oregon district court. Id.
41. Id. at 1016 (ruling that federal courts with jurisdiction have authority to regulate both on- and
off-reservation fishing in the interest of conservation).
42. Id. at 1016. Kennedy referred to the right to harvest salmon as the "res" of the treaty,
concluding that "[s]ince the existence of the salmon was inextricably linked to the res in the court's
constructive custody, the court was empowered to enjoin interference with that custody." Id. at
1015-16.

43. See infra notes 53-65 (discussing Lucas v. S.C. Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)), 66-77
(discussing Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)) and accompanying text.
44. See infra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing Gade v. Nat 'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass 'n,
505 U.S. 88 (1992)).
45. See infra notes 101-123 and accompanying text (discussing E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498
(1998) and City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999)).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 82:667, 2007

Any significance in Justice Kennedy's role in environmental
decisions during his first four years on the Court must be deciphered
from his silence between 1988 and 1991. In all but one of the thirteen
46
environmental decisions in which he took part during those four years
Justice Kennedy joined the majority without writing an opinion.47 That

46. Justice Kennedy did not take part in several environmental decisions issued by the Court
shortly after his confirmation. These included the Court's decision that states acquired title to lands
within their borders that were submerged beneath tidal waters not navigable-in-fact when they
joined the union, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Miss., 484 U.S. 469, 476 (1988), and the Court's holding
that the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment did not prohibit the United States Forest
Service from approving a timber sale in Northern California on federal public lands that included
sites sacred to the religions of several Native American tribes. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 442 (1988).
47. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989)
(opinion by Justice White holding that the Yakama Tribe did not have authority to regulate nontribal lands within its reservation boundaries); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490
U.S. 332 (1989) (opinion by Justice Stevens for a unanimous court holding that NEPA did not
require a fully-developed mitigation plan or a worst-case scenario analysis in an environmental
impact statement (EIS) prepared by the Forest Service analyzing a proposed alpine ski resort
development in Washington state); Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989)
(opinion by Justice Stevens for a unanimous court, in a companion case to Methow Valley Citizens
Council, holding that the Army Corps of Engineers complied with NEPA in the EIS on the Elk
Creek Dam in Oregon's Rogue River Basin because a worst-case analysis was not required in the
EIS, nor was a fully-developed mitigation plan; moreover, the Corps' decision not to supplement
the EIS was within its discretion and was not arbitrary and capricious); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v.
New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (opinion by Justice Stevens holding that a non-Indian
corporation leasing Jicarilla Apache tribal lands for oil and gas production could be taxed by the
state, as well as by the tribe, for the same activity); Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20
(1989) (opinion by Justice O'Connor dismissing a citizen suit filed by a dairy farmer against the
operator of a landfill on property adjacent to the farm for failing to meet the requirements of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act because the farmer failed to comply with the law's sixtyday notice requirement for citizen suits); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans,
491 U.S. 350 (1989) (opinion by Justice Scalia holding that a federal district court improperly
abstained from exercising its jurisdiction when it characterized a suit filed by a utility against a local
government for its failure to fully reimburse the utility for plant construction costs as a complex
state regulatory matter under exclusive jurisdiction of the state); Gen. Motors Corp. v. United
States, 496 U.S. 30 (1990) (opinion by Justice Blackmun for a unanimous court holding that EPA's
failure to approve a revised state implementation plan (SIP) under the Clean Air Act within the
four-month statutory deadline did not prevent the agency from enforcing the existing SIP);
California v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 495 U.S. 490 (1990) (opinion by Justice O'Connor
for a unanimous court holding that the Federal Power Act preempted state minimum instream flow
requirements for the Rock Creek hydroelectric project); Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871
(1990) (opinion by Justice Scalia holding that an environmental group's challenge to the Bureau of
Land Management's "land withdrawal review program" for violating both the National
Environmental Policy Act and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act failed because
affidavits by the organization's members claiming that they used lands "in the vicinity" of the lands
affected by the challenged decisions were insufficient to establish standing); Wis. Pub. Intervenor v.
Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991) (opinion by Justice White holding that the Federal Insecticide,
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48
exception was the Court's decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,
where Justice Kennedy joined both Justice White's dissent, which
denied that Congress intended to waive state sovereign immunity in the
1986 amendments to the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, 49 and Justice Scalia's dissent, which
denied that Congress had the power to waive the states' Eleventh
Amendment-protected immunity even if it intended to do so. 50
Kennedy's decision to join Scalia's dissent foreshadowed the

overturning of the majority opinion in Union Gas just six years later in
Seminole Tribe v. Florida,51 the first in a series of opinions expanding
state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.52
It was not until five years after Kennedy joined the court that he wrote

an opinion in an environmental case.

Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act did not preempt local government regulation of pesticide use when
those regulations did not conflict with federal regulations); Illinois v. Kentucky, 500 U.S. 380
(1991) (opinion by Justice Souter settling a boundary dispute between the two states by declaring
the boundary lies at the low water mark of the Ohio River as it existed in 1792).
In the final case from this era, Oklahoma v. New Mexico, Justice Kennedy joined all but one part
of Justice White's majority opinion resolving a dispute over New Mexico's diversion of additional
water from the Canadian River, which had been apportioned between it and Oklahoma and Texas
by an interstate compact. 501 U.S. 221, 242 (1991). Kennedy also joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part on the grounds that the Court's interpretation of the
Canadian River Compact, which gave New Mexico unrestricted use of waters originating above the
Conchas Dam but restricted its use below, was erroneous in that it considered water spilled over the
dam not to have originated above the dam, and thus was subject to the Compact's use restrictions to
ensure sufficient flows reach the downstream states. Id. at 244-45 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
48. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
49. Id. at 28 (White, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 57 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O'Connor also joined this opinion. Kennedy's decision to join even a partial dissent in an
environmental decision is notable because it has been an infrequent occurrence during his tenure on
the Court. See supra note 2 (discussing his remarkable record for voting with the majority in
environmental decisions).
51. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Seminole Tribe was joined
by Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Scalia, all of whom joined Justice Scalia's Union Gas dissent.
Id. at 66. The key fifth vote in Seminole Tribe came from Justice Clarence Thomas, who was
appointed to the court two years after Union Gas by George H.W. Bush in 1991. Cornell Law
School
Legal
Information
Institute,
Supreme
Court
Collection,
at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/justices/thomas.bio.html (last visited June 29, 2007).
52. See supra note 20 (discussing the Rehnquist Court's Eleventh Amendment revolution,
expanding the scope of state sovereign immunity).
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A. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
In 1992, Justice Kennedy broke his silence on the environment. In
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,53 he wrote a concurrence to
Justice Scalia's majority opinion ruling that the constitution required that
landowners receive compensation, subject to several exceptions, for
regulations that produced complete losses of economic value.54
Kennedy's concurrence was quite revealing, for it indicated that a
significant divide separated him from Justice Scalia.55 Although he
joined a six-member majority in Lucas,5 6 Kennedy's concurrence
emphasized his disagreement with Scalia concerning the scope of the
exemptions from the Lucas compensation rule.57 According to Kennedy,

53. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
54. See id. at 1032-36 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See generally Carol M. Rose, The Story of
Lucas: Environmental Land Use Regulation Between Developers and the Deep Blue Sea, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 237, 278 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck, eds. 2005)
(thoroughly discussing the context and significance of the case, the latter of which Rose considered
to be a prime example of "imbalanced propertization"). In what must be one of the prime examples
of the law of unintended consequences, the Lucas exceptions have proved much more significant
and enduring than the categorical takings rule the decision established. See Michael C. Blumm &
Lucus Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principlesas CategoricalTakings
Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 329 (2005).
55. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Measure of a Justice: Justice Scalia and the Faltering of the
Property Rights Movement within the Supreme Court, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 759, 801-03 (2006) (noting
Kennedy chose a "very different analytic framework" to evaluate regulatory takings in his
concurrence in Lucas from that advocated by Justice Scalia); Glenn P. Sugameli, Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council: The Categorical and Other "Exceptions" to Liability for Fifth
Amendment Takings of Private Property Far Outweigh the "Rule", 29 ENVTL. L. 939, 943-45
(1999) (discussing the "very different views" Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia expressed toward
regulatory takings in Lucas); F. Patrick Hubbard, Palazzolo, Lucas, and Penn Central: The Need for
Pragmatism, Symbolism, and Ad Hoc Balancing, 80 NEB. L. REV. 465, 487-89 (2001) (discussing
the divide between the Scalia and Kennedy view of a property owner's reasonable expectations);
Peter C. Meier, Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach: Taking Takings Into the Post-Lucas Era, 22
ECOLOGY L. Q. 413, 444 (1995) (arguing that courts should adopt Justice Kennedy's approach to
defining total takings over that advocated by Justice Scalia in order to allow for a "broader
understanding of regulatory power").
56. Justice Scalia wrote for himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Thomas. The Court reversed a decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court that had
upheld the state's defense to a landowner's takings claim on the ground that the state Beachfront
Management Act-which prohibited construction of dwellings on the landowner's barrier island
property (rendering his lots "valueless," according to a trial court stipulation)-was a legitimate use
of the police power and insulated from constitutional compensation by the so-called "nuisance
exception" to the takings clause because the state was preventing a public harm. Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 404 S.E. 2d 895, 901-02 (S.C. 1991).
57. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
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Scalia's exemption from compensation for regulations preventing
activities that would amount to common law nuisances 58 was too narrow
because the basic test for compensation for regulatory takings was
"whether the deprivation is contrary to reasonable, investment-backed
expectations. 59 Justice Kennedy's view was that because "courts must
consider all reasonable expectations whatever the source," the "common
law of nuisance is too narrow a confine for the exercise of a regulatory
power in a complex and interdependent society., 60 He would therefore
not subject all new regulatory initiatives to compensation requirements
where they produced economic wipeouts because changed conditions
and new ecological understandings might justify them. For example,
coastal property "may present such unique concerns for a fragile land
system that the State can go further in regulating its development and
6
use than the common law of nuisance might otherwise permit.", '
Justice Kennedy's Lucas concurrence was a clear signal that he was
not persuaded by Justice Scalia's effort to advance landowner rights in a
single judicial decree.6 2 Instead, Kennedy showed himself to be a
judicial conservative-a doctrinal minimalist 63 with an affinity for factspecific determinations.64 Kennedy's Lucas concurrence revealed him to
be not philosophically opposed to regulation if the need for it was
evident from the record. His mention of "fragile land[s]" as justifying
regulation indicated that, for Kennedy, context was a key factor.65

58. Id.at 1031.
59. Id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Where a taking is alleged from
regulation which deprives the property of all value, the test must be whether the deprivation is
contrary to reasonable, investment-backed expectations.").
60. Id. at 1035 ("In my view, reasonable expectations must be understood in light of the whole of
our legal tradition.").
61. Id. at 1035 ("[The] Takings Clause does not require a static body of state property law.").
Lower courts have not restricted the nuisance defense to common law nuisances. See Blumm &
Ritchie, supra note 54, at 335.
62. See Lazarus, supra note 55, at 787-88 (discussing Justice Scalia's efforts on the Court to
promote a property rights agenda).
63. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1996)
(discussing trends in invoking minimalism on the Supreme Court).
64. See supra notes 30-32 (rejecting an argument that a project with significant effects on the
cultural environment required an EIS absent any "causal nexus" between the project and any
significant cultural impact while sitting on the Ninth Circuit in Goodman Group, Inc. v. Dishroom,
679 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1982); infra note 87 (ruling that the Gun-Free School Zones Act, invalidated
by United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), was beyond the scope of congressional Commerce
Clause authority because it lacked a "commercial nexus").
65. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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B. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
Another well-known 1992 case prompted another Kennedy
concurrence. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,66 a six-member majority
of the Court ruled that environmentalists lacked standing to challenge a
Department of the Interior regulation exempting federal agencies acting
in foreign countries from the obligation to engage in Endangered Species
Act (ESA) consultation before undertaking proposals that could threaten
species listed under the statute. 67 Justice Scalia again wrote for the
majority, conceding that "the desire to use or observe an animal species,
even for purely aesthetic purposes, was undeniably a cognizable interest
for purpose of standing," but concluding that the environmentalists
suffered no "imminent injury," since past visits to the species' habitats
"prove nothing," and a mere intent to return in the future "without any
description of concrete plans" for doing so was insufficient to create
standing.68
Justice Kennedy concurred in most of the six-member majority
opinion, 69 but he objected to Justice Scalia's categorical rejection that
someone interested only in studying or seeing endangered species
"anywhere on the globe" could have standing under "animal nexus,"
"vocational nexus," or "ecosystem nexus" theories. 70 Although Kennedy

66. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
67. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). The environmental plaintiffs challenged
the application of this exemption to several federally-funded projects abroad, including U.S.
involvement in rebuilding the Aswan High Dam on the Nile in Egypt and construction of the
Mahaweli Dam in Sri Lanka, funded by the Agency for International Development. Id. at 563. A
district court initially dismissed the suit on the grounds that the environmental plaintiffs lacked
standing, but the Eighth Circuit reversed. On remand, the district court issued a judgment in favor of
the environmentalists, both on the standing issue and on the merits, which the Eighth Circuit upheld.
Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117, 118 (8th Cir. 1990). The only issue the Supreme
Court addressed was whether the environmentalists had standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558.
68. Id. at 562-64.
69. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice O'Connor, dissented, on the grounds that the plaintiffs
had standing-they had raised a "genuine issue" of material fact-and because the majority erred in
broadly rejecting standing for procedural injuries. Blackmun stated, "I cannot join the Court on
what amounts to a slash-and-burn expedition through the law of environmental standing." Id. at
589-90, 606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment because he did
not believe Congress intended the consultation requirements of the ESA to apply to activities
outside the U.S., but he filed a separate opinion because he disagreed with the Court's conclusion
that the environmentalists lacked standing. Id. at 581-82 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Souter
joined Kennedy's concurrence. Id. at 579.
70. Id. at 579. Justice Scalia considered such theories to be "beyond all reason." Id. at 566. Justice
Kennedy took more than six weeks to decide not to join Justice Scalia's opinion because he wanted
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agreed that the environmentalists in Defenders failed to demonstrate
concrete injury, he was "not willing to foreclose the possibility ...that
in different circumstances a nexus theory similar to those
proffered... might support a claim of standing."7 1 Kennedy's affinity to
nexus showings was again evident.
Kennedy's Defenders concurrence also cautioned that the Court
should not be understood to foreclose Congress from authorizing new
causes of action: "As government programs and policies become more
complex and far-reaching, we must be sensitive to the articulation of
new rights of action that do not have clear analogs in our common-law
tradition." 72 He noted that "Congress has the power to define injuries
and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or
controversy where none existed before," but maintained that Congress
must "identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the
class of persons entitled to bring suit. ' 73 A majority of the Court
74
subsequently adopted this reasoning in 2007, in Massachusetts v. EPA.
Kennedy's Defenders concurrence suggested, however, that Congress
failed to identify the injury the citizen suit provision of the ESA sought
to vindicate. Therefore, the ESA citizen suit provision did not obviate
the need for plaintiffs to demonstrate injury for standing purposes
because
revisions to the section on redressability, objecting to Scalia's effort to require "particularized
injury." Justice Scalia made some changes, but Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence
anyway, a decision that made Justice Scalia "irate," considering it to have "'scuttled' his majority
opinion." See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlightsfrom the
Blackmun Papers, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,637, 10,659 (2005) (citing Memorandum from Geoffrey
M. Klinebert to Justice Blackmun (Jun. 2, 1992), Harry A. Blackmun Papers, box 591).
71. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am.
Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 231 n.4 (1986), for the proposition that members of a whalewatching and studying organization would be adversely affected by continued whale harvesting).
72. Id. at 580.
73. Id.
74. -U.S.
(Apr. 2, 2007), 127 S.Ct. 1438 (2007). Justice Stevens's 5-4 majority opinion in
Massachusettsv. EPA relied heavily on language from Justice Kennedy's Defenders concurrence to
support the conclusion that a litigant does not have to satisfy the normal redressability and
immediacy requirements for standing when Congress created a procedural right to protect the
litigant's interests: "When a litigant is vested with a procedural right, that litigant has standing if
there is some possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider
the decision that allegedly harmed the litigant." Id. at 1453 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572).
Therefore, Justice Stevens concluded that the state of Massachusetts had standing to challenge
EPA's decision not to regulate greenhouse gas emissions because the agency's "steadfast
refusal ... present[ed] a risk of harm to Massachusetts that [was] both 'actual' and 'imminent'." Id.
at 1455 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
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while the statute purports to confer a right on "any person ...to
enjoin... the United States and any other governmental

instrumentality or agency... who is alleged to be in violation of
any provision of this chapter," it does not of its own force
establish that there is an injury "in any person" by virtue of any
"violation. 7 5
Although he agreed with the majority's conclusion that the plaintiffs
failed to satisfy the "concrete injury" requirement for standing, he was
unwilling to foreclose the possibility that a "nexus" theory of standing
might be appropriate under different circumstances.76 As in Lucas,
Kennedy was unwilling to follow the Scalian common-law model as a
paradigm for resolving modem environmental controversies.77
C. Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Association
In another 1992 decision, a divided Court ruled that two Illinois
hazardous waste licensing laws that required worker training were
preempted by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA).7 8
Justice O'Connor authored the five-member majority opinion,
concluding that the federal statute impliedly preempted the state laws
because they conflicted with the "full purposes and objectives" of
OSHA, which indicated that "Congress intended to subject employers
and employees to only one set of regulations. 7 9

75. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580.

76. The requirement that a plaintiff show a "concrete and personal" injury to establish standing,
Kennedy wrote, both "preserves the vitality of the adversarial process" and "confines the Judicial

Branch to its proper, limited role in the constitutional framework of Govemment." Id. at 581.
77. See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing after Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "'Injuries," and Article
11I,
91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 215-20 (1992) (criticizing Justice Scalia's tradition-bound arguments for
a narrow concept of Article Ill standing requiring actual injury); Daniel J. Farber, Is the Supreme
Court Irrelevant? Reflections on the Judicial Role in Environmental Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 547,
555-58 (1997) (discussing Justice Scalia's "campaign against environmental standing" in decisions
restricting the judicial role in environmental laws). Justice Scalia made clear his support for

constricting standing extra-judicially in a much-cited 1983 law review article. Antonin Scalia, The
Doctrine of Standing as an Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 894

(1983).
78. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992). The state statutes aimed to
"promote job safety" and "protect life, limb, and property" by requiring workers who may be
exposed to hazardous wastes on the job to take at least forty hours of training under an approved
Illinois program, pass a written examination, and complete an annual refresher course. See id. at 91.
Federal OSHA regulations require hazardous waste workers to receive at least forty hours of
training off-site and a minimum of three days of supervised field experience. See id. at 92.
79. Id. at 98. Gade is among a number of Court decisions invalidating state statutes conflicting
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Justice Kennedy concurred in part, but he disagreed with Justice
O'Connor's reliance on conflict preemption. Instead, he would have
found express preemption; he thought Congress, in OSHA, intended to
displace state regulations even where there was no actual conflict
between state laws and federal regulations. 80 His willingness to broadly
interpret the preemptive effect of OSHA on state hazardous waste
worker training statutes showed that Kennedy's states' rights perspective
did not extend to state laws that appeared to impose duplicative
regulations on businesses.
D. C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown
Justice Kennedy finally produced a majority opinion in an
environmental case in 1994, seven years after his ascension to the Court.
In C & A Carbone, Inc., v. Town of Clarkstown,8 1 a town ordinance
required all non-hazardous solid waste generated within the town to be
deposited at a private waste transfer station that would collect the waste
and separate the recyclable from the non-recyclable material. 82 The
ordinance in effect created a local monopoly by guaranteeing a
minimum flow of waste to the station, which would then collect a fee in
excess of the market rate and, after five years, sell the facility to the
town for $1.83 A private recycler in the town challenged the ordinance's
constitutionality because it prevented him from shipping to cheaper outof-state processors, and the Court, in a 6-3 decision, struck down the
ordinance as an undue burden on interstate commerce.84

with federal laws under the doctrine of "obstacle preemption," in which a state law will be found
unconstitutional if it interferes with the underlying purposes of a federal statute. See Robert A.
Shapiro, Toward a Theory of InteractiveFederalism, 91 IOWA L. REv. 243, 262 (2005) (discussing

recent Court decisions invoking "obstacle preemption" to conclude a state law is unconstitutional
although it does not conflict with the actual provisions of a federal law, because it conflicts with the
underlying purposes of a federal statute).
80. Gade, 505 U.S. at 109 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Souter dissented, joined by Justices
Blackmun, Stevens, and Thomas. He concluded that "traditional police powers of the State survive
until Congress has made a purpose to pre-empt them clear." Id. at 121-22 (Souter, J., dissenting).
81. 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
82. Id. at 387.

83. Id.
84. Id. at 384. Justice Kennedy wrote for Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg. Justice
O'Connor concurred in the judgment, while Justice Souter wrote a dissent, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun.
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For Justice Kennedy, even though the ordinance did not explicitly
regulate interstate commerce, "it [did] so nevertheless by its practical
effect and design." 85 Such a burden could be justified if it were the only
method available to advance a legitimate local interest, but because there
were alternative ways of financing the town's transfer facility, the
ordinance could not, in Kennedy's view, survive judicial review.86
E. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe
In 1997, during his tenth year on the Court, Justice Kennedy wrote his
second majority environmental law opinion, in a case in which state
sovereignty loomed large.8 7 The Coeur d'Alene Indian Tribe sued the

85. Id. at 394. Kennedy relied on a long line of cases he termed "local processing requirements
that we have long held invalid." Id. at 391-92 (citing South-Central Timber Dev. Co. v. Wunnicke,
467 U.S. 82 (1984) (striking down an Alaska regulation that required all Alaska timber to be
processed within the state prior to export)). He observed that "[t]he essential vice in laws of this sort
is that they bar the import of the processing service. Out-of-state meat inspectors, or shrimp hullers,
[are] deprived of access to local demand for their services. Put another way, the offending local
laws hoard a local resource [for] the benefit of local businesses that treat it." Id. at 392.
86. Justice O'Connor's concurrence faulted the majority opinion for characterizing the "flow
control" ordinance as discriminating against interstate commerce, when in fact it discriminated
against all competition, both local and interstate, but she concluded that it nevertheless imposed
excessive burdens on interstate trade in relationship to the local benefits obtained. Id. at 401
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Souter's dissent (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Blackmun) emphasized the fact that the ordinance discriminated against both in-state and out-ofstate providers, and "directly aid[ed] the government in satisfying a traditional governmental
responsibility." Id. at 410-11 (Souter, J., dissenting).
87. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997). Between the Carbone and the
Coeur d'Alene decisions, the Court decided United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), a nonenvironmental law decision but one with considerable implications for environmental law. In Lopez,
the Court limited Congress's Commerce Clause power-the basis of most environmental statutesfor the first time in sixty years. Lopez led to questions about the constitutionality of the application
of the Endangered Species Act to so-called non-commercial species. But four circuit court decisions
upheld the application of the statute to species with little or no commercial value on a variety of
grounds. See Michael C. Blumm & George N. Kimbrell, Flies, Wolves, Spiders, Toads, and the
Constitutionality of the Endangered Species Act's Take Provision, 34 ENVTL. L. 309, 327-41
(2004) (discussing the circuit court decisions).
Justice Kennedy's concurrence, joined by Justice O'Connor, supplied the deciding votes in
Lopez. His opinion was quite revealing. Although he acknowledged that the history of the
Commerce Clause "counsels great restraint" from reviewing courts, Kennedy thought the Gun-Free
School Zones Act was beyond congressional power because gun possession had no commercial
character, and the "purposes and designs" of the statute had no "commercial nexus." Where
legislation reached beyond commercial activity "in the ordinary and usual sense of the term," the
judicial role was to inquire into whether the federal government was intruding on an area of
traditional state control, because otherwise, the states could lose their role as "laboratories of
experimentation." Lopez, 504 U.S. at 668-83.
Kennedy's search for a factual "nexus"--echoing his willingness to entertain nexus theories of
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state of Idaho and several state agencies and officials in federal district
court, claiming that an 1873 Executive Order-which defined the
boundaries of the original Coeur d'Alene Reservation-recognized the
tribe's ownership of the bed and banks of Lake Coeur d'Alene long
before Idaho became a state in 1890.88 The district court dismissed the

suit as barred by the Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity, which
protects states from federal court suits. 89 But the Ninth Circuit revived

the case under the Ex parte Young9 exception to the Eleventh
Amendment, which allows challenges to state officials implementing
unconstitutional laws. 9' The Supreme Court reversed 5-4, with Justice
Kennedy writing for the majority, although only Chief Justice Rehnquist
fully joined his opinion."
Although an ongoing violation of federal law is generally sufficient to
invoke the Ex parte Young exception, 93 Justice Kennedy concluded that
the applicability of the Young exception is a function of a case-by-case
evaluation of the facts.94 Under his factual scrutiny, the tribe's suit was
the "functional equivalent of a quiet title action implicating special
sovereignty interests. 95 The Young exception did not apply because an
injunction against state officials would prevent the state from asserting
jurisdiction over submerged lands, held in trust for the public, and cause
standing in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), see supra notes 70-71, and his
circuit court opinion in Goodman Group, Inc. v. Dishroom, 679 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1982), supra
notes 30-31 -would become characteristic of his approach to environmental cases over the next
decade.
88. Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. 261, 264-65 (1997) (citing Executive Order of Nov. 8, 1873,
reprinted in I INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 837 (Charles J. Kappler, ed) (1904)). The
executive order did not mention the lakebed, but it defined one of the reservation's boundaries as
the point where the Spokane Riverjoined Lake Coeur d'Alene and "thence down along the center of
the channel of said Spokane River . "d.
I.."
89. U.S. CONST., amend. XI.

90. 209 U.S. 123, 155, 159-60 (1908) (holding that a federal court injunction preventing the
Minnesota Attorney General from enforcing an unconstitutional state law did not violate the
Eleventh Amendment because, when violating the federal Constitution, the state official is "stripped
of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his
individual conduct").
91. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho v. Idaho, 42 F.3d 1244, 1248 (9th Cir. 1994).
92. Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 263. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas concurred, along
with the Chief Justice. Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented.
93. Id. at 281.
94. Id. at 280. Justice Kennedy ruled that the only way the tribe's suit could proceed was under
the Young exception, as the state's sovereign immunity applied to the tribe which, for purposes of
the Eleventh Amendment, had the status of a foreign sovereign. Id. at 269.
95. Id. at 262.
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the state's sovereign interest in its waters to be "affected in a degree
fully as intrusive as almost any conceivable retroactive levy upon funds
in its Treasury. 96
In part of the opinion joined only by the Chief Justice, Kennedy
explained that the applicability of the Young exception must always be
the product of "a careful balancing and accommodation of state
interests. '97 Justice O'Connor, writing for Justices Scalia and Thomas,
concurred in the result but did not agree with the balancing. Where there
is an ongoing violation of federal law in suits seeking prospective relief,
Justice O'Connor thought there was no requirement that federal
jurisdiction should be predicated on a judicial balancing of federal and
state interests.98 Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor did not often
disagree, 99 but in the Coeur d'Alene case, Kennedy showed himself to be
more devoted to judicial balancing and state sovereignty than
O'Connor.100

96. 1d. at 287. This quote nicely foreshadowed Kennedy's approach to the retroactive legislation
at issue in Eastern Enterprisesv. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998), discussed infra notes 103-104, 106
and accompanying text.
97. Coeurd'Alene, 521 U.S. at 278.
98. Id. at 291 (O'Connor, J., concurring). However, Justice O'Connor thought that the Young
exception was inapplicable in this case because an injunction against state officials would amount to
divesting the state of regulatory authority, the equivalent of a quiet title action to sovereign lands.
Thus, the suit was effectively against the state itself, and therefore barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. Id.
99. See infra note 199, noting that Justices Kennedy and O'Connor were in agreement in eightynine percent of the cases discussed in this study in which both participated. Their tendency to agree
in environmental cases is also reflected in O'Connor's environmental protection score, as updated
by Cannon, supra note 7, which as of the 2004 term was 36.1 percent, just two percent better than
Justice Kennedy's score of 34.1 percent. Id.
100. The tribe ultimately prevailed when it persuaded the federal government, which is not
limited by the Eleventh Amendment, to file suit against the state, and a 5-4 Court upheld the tribal
claim as a valid pre-statehood reservation. Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001). Justice
Souter wrote a majority opinion in the case, joined by Justices Stevens, Breyer, O'Connor, and
Ginsburg. Justice Kennedy joined Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion, which took issue with the
majority's opinion because the Chief Justice did not find sufficient evidence of congressional intent
to convey the submerged lands beneath Lake Coeur d'Alene prior to granting Idaho statehood. Id. at
288 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). This case was one of Justice Kennedy's three full environmental
dissents. In Apfel, infra notes 103-106 and accompanying text, Justice Kennedy concurred in the
judgment but dissented in part. See infra Appendix A case table.
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F. Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel
In 1998, the Court invalidated provisions of the federal Coal Industry
Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992, which required companies
previously employing coal miners to pay some of their health care costs
in retirement, even if the companies had left the coal mining business.' 0 '
A four-justice plurality, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, thought that
the statute worked a compensable taking of property by "impos[ing]
severe retroactive liability on a limited class of parties that could not
have anticipated the liability, and the extent of that liability is
substantially disproportionate to the parties' experience."',0 2 Supplying
the decisive fifth vote to strike down the statute, Justice Kennedy
disagreed with the plurality on the takings issue, finding that "the
mechanism by which the Government injures Eastern is so unlike the act
of taking specific property that it is incongruous to call the Coal Act a
taking .... ,,03
In the absence of a specific property interest to trigger the takings
clause, Kennedy maintained that the retroactive effect of the legislation
was more appropriately evaluated under the due process clause, not the
takings clause. 0 4 His reluctance to employ the takings clause to
scrutinize the wisdom of legislation would eventually gain a majority of
the Court in the 2005 Lingle decision. 10 5 On the other hand, Kennedy's
willingness to employ substantive due process, at least in the context of
a statute imposing retroactive liability, might be the product of his

101. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 542 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting

in part) (interpreting 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-22 (1994)).
102. Id. at 528-29. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined Justice
O'Connor's opinion.
103. Id. at 542 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas joined
Justice Kennedy's concurrence.
104. Id. at 547-49:
Although we have been hesitant to subject economic legislation to due process scrutiny as
a general matter, the Court has given careful consideration to due process challenges to
legislation with retroactive effects....
The case before us represents one of the rare instances where the Legislature has exceeded the
limits imposed by due process .... [By] creating liability for events which occurred 35 years
ago the Coal Act has a retroactive effect of unprecedented scope.
The four-member dissent agreed with Justice Kennedy that the statute should be evaluated on
due process grounds, but thought that the lifetime benefits required by the legislation were
reasonable considering the profits that the coal miners provided to the corporation and the
foreseeable nature of the miners' illnesses. Id. at 558 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
105. See infra notes 215-226 and accompanying text.
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fidelity to factual analysis. In Apfel, he was able to employ the
substantive due process inquiry to balance the health problems of former

coal company employees against the retroactive
nature of the liability
06
imposed on the companies in favor of the latter. 1
G. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey

In 1999, Justice Kennedy wrote his third environmental law majority
opinion for the Court, in a case concerning a long-running dispute over
the proposed development of an environmentally sensitive thirty-seven
acre tract of beach in Monterey, California, that had been formerly used
as an oil terminal. 0 7 The developer had originally proposed 344
residential units, but the proposal was scaled back during five years of
negotiations with the city to 190 units. 10 8 Even though the 190-unit
development preserved roughly half of the acreage as open space, the
city council ultimately denied land use approval, citing concerns over
the adequacy of public access and environmental damage, especially
destruction of habitat of the endangered Smith's Blue Butterfly.' 0 9 The
developer filed a federal suit under § 1983,110 alleging a compensable

taking. 1' After an initial round of litigation over the ripeness of the

106. Apfel, 524 U.S. at 549-50 ("While we have upheld the imposition of liability on former
employers based on past employment relationships, the statutes at issue were remedial, designed to
impose an 'actual, measurable cost of [the employer's] business' which the employer had been able
to avoid in the past... The Coal Act, however, does not serve this purpose. Eastern was once in the
coal business and employed many of the beneficiaries, but [their] expectation of lifetime
benefits... [was] created by promises and agreements made long after Eastern left the coal
business .... This case is far outside the bounds of retroactivity permissible under our law.").
107. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 694 (1999).
108. Id. at 695-96.
109. Id. at 696-98. The oil company that formerly owned the property had introduced a nonnative ice plant to help control erosion on the site. The ice plant crowded out native plants,
spreading over a quarter of the property by the time of the proposed development. The invasive ice
plant largely supplanted native buckwheat, habitat for the endangered Smith's Blue Butterfly
(Euphilotes enoptes smithi). Id. at 695. The Smith's Blue Butterfly, which lives in two species of
buckwheat on the California coast from Monterey Bay through Point Gorda, was listed as an
endangered species under the ESA in 1976, after invasive plants and coastal development destroyed
much of its native habitat. 41 Fed. Reg. 22,041 (June 1, 1976). See Essig Museum of Entomology,
University of California at Berkeley, California's Endangered Insects - Smith's Blue Butterfly,
http://essig.berkeley.edu/endins/euphilsm.htm (last visited June 29, 2007).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (making those who use the color of state law to deprive citizens of
their rights under federal law liable to the injured party).
11.

Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 694.
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city's appeal," 2 the district court submitted the developer's takings
claim to a jury, which awarded the developer $1.45 million in temporary
taking damages."13 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, ruling that the takings
claim was properly submitted to the jury, and that the evidence
supported the developer's contention that the city's repeated denials
were disproportionate to the proposal's nature and effect." 14 The
Supreme Court accepted certiorari.115
Justice Kennedy wrote for a narrow five-member majority, which16
upheld the appropriateness of submitting the takings claim to the jury."
Although the Court unanimously rejected the application of the "rough
proportionality" test of Dolan v. Tigard'"7 to land use decisions not
involving exactions dedicating private property to public use," 8 the jury
issue fractured the Court.

112. The district court ruled that the developer's takings claim was not ripe because it failed to
exhaust its remedies under state law, but the Ninth Circuit reversed on the ground that California
law did not authorize compensation for a temporary taking. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v.
City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496, 1507 (9th Cir. 1990).
113. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1435 (9th Cir.
1996). The developer won temporary takings damages, despite the fact that the value of the property
increased substantially throughout the protracted litigation: selling for $3.7 million in 1984, three
years after the case was filed, and then selling again to the state for $4.5 million in 1991. See Nancy
E. Stroud, Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterrey: How FarDoes It Limit "Rough Proportionality"
SEP.-OCT.
2000,
in Land Use Cases?, A.B.A. PROPERTY & PROBATE MAG.,
http://www.abanet.org/rppt/publications/magazine/2000/soOOstroud.html.
114. Del Monte Dunes, 95 F.3d at 1432.
115. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 523 U.S. 1045 (1998).
116. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707-22 (1999).
117. 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (holding that conditioning a hardware store's building permit on
dedication of a public greenway and bicycle path lacked a "rough proportionality" to the public
costs of the development, and thus was a taking under the Fifth Amendment). In a memo to Justice
Blackmun regarding the case, Kennedy noted that he agreed with Scalia's suggestion that Rehnquist
include the phrase "rough proportionality" in the Dolan opinion because he felt the case needed
stronger language to ensure that land use regulators sufficiently justified regulatory exactions.
Kennedy thought "it important to state that the exaction must be commensurate, though not to the
point of demanding exact mathematical precision... " See Percival, supra note 70, at 10,656,
(quoting Memorandum from Justice Kennedy to Chief Justice Rehnquist (May 16, 1994), Harry A.
Blackmun Papers, box 645). Blackmun included in his notes on the Dolan decision that Kennedy
had remarked that "the cities are not hurting" and that the "burden of proof [is] on the city" to
justify an exaction. Id.
118. Both the majority, Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 703, and the dissent, id. at 733 (Souter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) agreed that Dolan 's "rough proportionality" test was not
applicable to this case, since it involved no exaction requiring dedication of private land to the
public.
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Justice Kennedy decided that the jury was not evaluating the
reasonableness of the city's land use regulations, but whether the city's
rejection of the Del Monte development was reasonably related to a
legitimate public purpose. 1 9 Consequently, it was within the trial court's
discretion to grant a jury trial. 20 Further, Kennedy ruled that a federal
suit seeking damages for an unconstitutional denial of compensation for
a taking fell within the scope of the Seventh Amendment's right to a jury
trial. 12 1 But, his opinion was careful to limit the scope of the Court's
decision concerning the availability of federal jury trials. Kennedy
reasoned that the right to a jury trial extended to § 1983 suits challenging
the reasonableness of a specific governmental denial, not to suits
challenging the reasonableness of the regulations themselves. 22 Justice
Scalia's concurrence advocated a much broader federal right to a jury
trial, while the four-member dissent, authored by Justice Souter, denied
123
any federal right to a jury trial for takings claimants.
Characteristically, Justice Kennedy pursued a middle road between the
Scalian position and that of the Court's moderates.
H. Amoco v. Southern Ute Tribe
Justice Kennedy authored his fourth majority environmental law
opinion, one which involved public lands, in 1999124 The Coal Lands
Acts of 1909 and 1910 reserved "coal" on certain public lands to the
federal government, which the government then made available for
homesteading, including lands the Southern Ute Tribe had ceded to the
United States in 1880.125 In 1938, the federal government conveyed any

119. Id. at 706.
120. Id. at 721.
121. Id. at 720-21 ("[W]hether a landowner has been deprived of all economically viable use of
his property is a predominantly factual question .... in actions at law otherwise within the purview

of the Seventh Amendment, this question is for the jury.").
122. Id. at 721-22 (interpreting the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and distinguishing a takings claim
from a condemnation claim, in which there is no right to a jury trial).
123. Id. at 723 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 733 (Souter,

J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
124. Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865 (1999).
125. See id. at 869-70 (citing Coal Lands Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 844, 30 U.S.C. § 81; Coal Lands
Act of 1910, 36 Stat. 583, 30 U.S.C. §§ 83-85) (explaining the context of the Coal Lands Acts,

which followed a 1906 withdrawal of sixty-four million acres of public land from homesteading by
President Theodore Roosevelt to prevent coal companies from employing homestead laws to
speculate in coal).
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interest it had in the ceded lands, including its "coal" rights, back to the
tribe. 12 6 Subsequently, coalbed methane gas became an important energy
resource, and oil and gas producers obtained rights to extract it from the
homesteaders' successors. 2 7 In 1991, the Southern Ute Tribe filed suit,
claiming that it owned the coalbed methane gas, since the gas was
included in the government's reservation in the 1909 and 1910
statutes. 128 The district court ruled against the tribe, but the Tenth Circuit
reversed. 129
In a 7-1 decision, Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Amoco
Products Co. v. Southern Ute Tribes'30 reversed the Tenth Circuit and
rejected the tribe's claims.' 3' Kennedy observed that the question was
"not whether, given what scientists know today, it makes sense to regard
[coalbed methane] gas as a constituent of coal but whether Congress so
regarded it in 1909 and 1910.,,132 He concluded that Congress did not,
because the "common conception" of coal when the statutes passed was
solid rock; in fact, the associated gas was considered a dangerous and
valueless byproduct. 133 This "natural interpretation" of the meaning of
"coal" in 1909-1910 as not encompassing the associated gas was
sufficient to persuade Kennedy and the majority not to employ the
public land law interpretive canon that "ambiguities in land grants are
construed in favor of the sovereign or the competing canons relied on by
[the tribe].' 3 4 Among the interpretive rules that Justice Kennedy
126. Id. at 870.
127. Id. at 871 (noting that oil and gas companies leased some 200,000 acres of land from
landowners in which the tribe owns the underlying coal).
128. Id.
129. See S. Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 874 F. Supp. 1142, 1154 (D. Colo. 1995)
(holding that Congress intended to reserve solid rock coal, not coal bed methane gas, based on the
plain meaning of the term "coal"); S. Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 119 F.3d 816, 826 (10th
Cir. 1997) (holding that the text of the Coal Lands Acts did not indicate one way or the other
whether Congress intended to reserve coalbed methane gas, and that ambiguities in mineral
reservations should be resolved in favor of the government). An en banc panel of the Tenth Circuit
upheld this decision. S. Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 151 F.3d 1251, 1256 (10th Cir. 1998).
130. 526 U.S. 865 (1999).
131. Id. at 880. Justice Breyer did not take part in the decision. Only Justice Ginsburg dissented.
Id. at 880-81 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (concluding that ambiguities in land grants should be
construed in favor of the federal government, especially because at the time of the Coal Lands Acts,
the gas was considered a potential liability that would have been the responsibility of whoever had
title to the coal).
132. Id. at 873.
133. Id. at 874-75.
134. Id. at 880.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 82:667, 2007

disregarded were the Indian law canons that courts should construe
ambiguities in favor of tribes and interpret statutes liberally in their
favor. 35
'
This result was strange, given that both the federal government and
the tribe argued that the Coal Lands Acts reserved the methane gas. But,
Kennedy and the majority were unwilling to defer to the government, the
public land canon, or the Indian law canons; instead, they favored a
"natural interpretation" of the meaning of "coal" from ninety years
earlier.136 Perhaps Kennedy viewed the case as the equivalent of an
attempt to impose retroactive property loss on the oil and gas
companies. 137
I. The Kennedy EnvironmentalRecord Priorto 2000
In Justice Kennedy's first dozen years on the Supreme Court, he
showed himself to be devoted to fact-based balancing, skeptical of broad
doctrinal changes, and committed to a nuanced approach to most
environmental issues. Although he subscribed to the categorical takings
doctrine established in Lucas, he wanted a larger nuisance exception
than Justice Scalia articulated for the Court, and he was concerned about
fashioning a doctrine protective of "fragile" lands."' And while
Kennedy denied environmentalists standing in Defenders, he indicated
an openness to animal, vocational, and ecosystem nexus theories of
standing.1 39 Kennedy is a professed adherent to state sovereignty, 140 but

135. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 119-24 (Nell Jessup Newton ed.,
2005).
136. Amoco, 526 U.S. at 880.
137. Note the similarity to Kennedy's aversion to retroactive regulation in Apfel, supra note 106,
as well as the sentiments he voiced in Coeur d'Alene, supra notes 98-100. Dean David Getches has
shown how the Court frequently employs subjective equitable balancing in Indian cases rather than
employ foundational Indian law principles. David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist
Court's Pursuit of States' Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV.
267, 344-50 (2001). See also David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New
Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1644-45 (1996)
(surveying Justice Kennedy's Indian law jurisprudence, which includes joining every opinion
denying tribal sovereign immunity, and noting that Justice Kennedy "has displayed a profound
).
disinterest in Indian law ....
138. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992), discussed supra note 61 and
accompanying text.
139. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 579 (1992), discussed supra note 70 and
accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 278 (1997), discussed supra
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he is willing to preempt state statutes to prevent overregulation,1 4 1 and
he will employ the Commerce Clause for the same purpose. 142 He was
143
open to jury trials to decide takings cases under limited circumstances
but opposed to employing takings doctrine to question the wisdom of
legislation.144 He will interpret legislation protecting fragile lands and
establishing ecosystem-nexus causes of action generously, 45 but he does
not generously interpret retroactive legislation. 146 This nuanced approach
to environmental claims would continue after 2000.
III.

DECISIONS OF 2000-2004

The new millennium saw Justice Kennedy make some surprising
comments about the effect of the Executive's authority on Congress's
ability to authorize the imposition of civil penalties as a result of citizen
suits. 14 7 He also continued his readiness to preempt state statutes in the
interest of eliminating duplicative regulation. 48 And he supported a
relaxed ripeness doctrine and the elimination of the government's
categorical defense for pre-existing regulations in takings cases. 149 At
the same time he endorsed a large view of property that made successful
takings claims against environmental regulation unlikely. 50 In his sole
written dissent in an environmental case, his view of cooperative

note and accompanying text.
141. See Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 109 (1992), discussed supra note
80 and accompanying text.
142. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394 (1994), discussed supra
note 85 and accompanying text.
143. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 721 (1999),
discussed supra note 119-120 and accompanying text.
144. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 542, 545 (1998), discussed supra notes 103-104.
145. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032-36 (1992), discussed supra note
58-61 and accompanying text (fragile lands); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 579-81
(1992), discussed supra notes 70-75 (ecosystem-nexus theory of standing).
146. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing Amoco, Apfel, and Coeur d'Alene).
147. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 193, 197 (2000),
discussed infra notes 159-160 and accompanying text.
148. See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 105-16 (2000), discussed infra notes 161-171 and
accompanying text.
149. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 625-27 (2001), discussed infra notes 175-182
and accompanying text.
150. See id. at 632, discussed infra note 183 and accompanying text (Kennedy refusing the
landowner's invitation to conceptually sever his property by looking only at the restricted wetlands
and ignoring the unregulated uplands which retained substantial economic value).
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federalism led him to endorse a non-statutory interpretation of the Clean
Water Act that reflected his view that states' rights are more important
than environmental protection.1 51
A. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw
Whether environmentalists could maintain a Clean Water Act citizen
suit for civil penalties drew a curious concurrence from Justice Kennedy
in 2000 in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw.152 The environmentalists
claimed that they fished in and recreated on waters polluted by a
company's mercury discharges in violation of its Clean Water Act
permit.1 53 The district court agreed that the company had violated its
permit and imposed a civil fine of over $400,000, but it declined to issue
an injunction because the company had achieved substantial compliance
with its permit during the litigation. 154 The Fourth Circuit reversed, on
the ground that the environmentalists' suit was moot, because the only
to the government,
available remedy, the payment of civil 1penalties
55
would not redress any injury they suffered.
The Supreme Court upheld the environmentalists' standing, reversing
the Fourth Circuit in a 7-2 decision written by Justice Ginsburg. 156 The
majority ruled that civil penalties in citizen suits do in fact redress a
plaintiffs injuries, due to the deterrent effect they have on future
violations.1 57 The majority also held that the suit was not moot, because

151. See Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 502-18 (2004), discussed
infra notes 194-203 and accompanying text.

152. 528 U.S. at 197 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 181-83.
154. See id. at 178.
155. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 149 F.3d 303, 306-07 (4th Cir.
(1998)).
156. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 173-74. Although Justice Ginsburg attended Harvard Law School for a
year, she graduated from Columbia Law School. When she was nominated by President Clinton,
Kennedy sent a note to Justice Blackmun (like Kennedy, a Harvard Law School graduate) that the
Court was still one vote short of a Harvard Law School majority (with Ginsburg replacing Byron
White, a Yale Law School alum), although he did state, "But if you are patient, we shall prevail.
Tony." See Percival, supra note 70, at 10,661 (citing Note from Justice Kennedy to Justice
Blackmun (Jun. 14, 1993), Harry A. Blackmun Papers, box 116). And Justice Kennedy was correct:
with the appointment of Chief Justice Roberts, Harvard Law School now has a five-member
majority on the Court.
157. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 185. The Court distinguished the case from Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (finding no standing, due to lack of redressability, for
environmentalists to bring a suit for civil penalties because the company agreed to comply with the

Justice Kennedy and the Environment

the company failed to prove58that it was "absolutely clear" that the permit
violations would not recur.
Justice Kennedy issued a cryptic concurrence in Laidlaw, raising the
question of the constitutionality of civil penalties in citizen suits:
Difficult and fundamental questions are raised when we ask
whether exactions of public fines by private litigants, and the
delegation of Executive power which might be inferable from
the authorization, are permissible in view of the responsibilities
by Article II of the Constitution of
committed to the Executive
59
the United States.1

With these words, Kennedy seemed to open the door for constitutional
challenges to statutory civil penalty provisions based on congressional
that the President "take Care that
interference with Article II's directive
' 60
the Laws be faithfully executed.'
B. United States v. Locke
Justice Kennedy authored his fifth environmental law majority
opinion in 2000, this one for a unanimous Court, in another preemption
case. In United States v. Locke, 16 1 the Court invalidated Washington
state laws, passed in the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, regulating
oil tankers in the state's waters. 162 An oil tanker trade association

permit), on the ground that in Steel Co., there was no allegation of any continuing or imminent
violation, whereas in Laidlaw, the violations were "ongoing at the time of the complaint" and
"could continue into the future if undeterred." Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 188. Justices Scalia and Thomas
dissented because they believed Steel Co. should have controlled: "a plaintiff's desire to benefit
from the deterrent effect of a public penalty for past conduct can never suffice to establish
[standing]." Id. at 205. Justice Kennedy joined the majority in Steel Co., but he also joined Justice
O'Connor's concurrence, which cautioned against interpreting the Court's opinion to create an
"exhaustive list of circumstances under which a federal court may exercise judgment" in assuming
jurisdiction, an apparent effort to preserve trial court discretion and limit the reach of the majority's
concurring).
opinion. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 110 (O'Connor, J.,
158. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 193.
159. Id. at 197 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
160. U.S. CONST., Art. II, § 3. This sentiment echoed one expressed by Justice Scalia eight years
earlier in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992), when he wrote, "To permit
Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers' compliance with the
law into an 'individual right' vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the
President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to 'take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed ....
161. 529 U.S. 89 (2000).
162. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 96-97 (2000). Washington created a state Office of
Marine Safety and directed it to devise standards for spill prevention plans which would provide
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challenged the state's regulations on the grounds that federal uniformity
preempted state authority to regulate vessels. After the district court
upheld the state regulations, the federal government intervened on behalf
of the tanker operators,
but the Ninth Circuit upheld all but one of the
163
state regulations.

The Supreme Court reversed.164 Justice Kennedy interpreted the
savings clause in the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990165-legislation
Congress passed as its own reaction to the Exxon Valdez spill-to create
only a limited exception to the general rule of federal preemption in
maritime law, allowing states to continue to enforce liability rules
against companies responsible for oil spills. 166 Subject to this limited

exception in the OPA, Kennedy ruled that the Ports and Waterways
Safety Act of 1972167 controls vessel regulation, and the OPA did not
affect the 1972 law's preemptive effect on conflicting state
regulations.168 While a state may have a legitimate interest in passing
regulations to prevent an environmental disaster like an oil spill, he
maintained that the Court must inquire into whether the local laws are
consistent with the federal scheme, including the 1972 statute's objective
of providing "uniformity of regulation for maritime commerce."' 169 The
Court therefore invalidated some of the Washington regulations as
preempted by federal law and remanded the remainder for
reconsideration by the district court. 7 ° Justice Kennedy did
acknowledge the potential widespread harm to the environment that the

the "best achievable protection" from oil spills. The ensuing regulations developed by the agency
regulated tanker design, equipment, reporting, and operating requirements. If a vessel failed to
comply with these regulations, it could be subject to penalties, restrictions on its ability to operate in
the state's waters, or be barred from access to the state's waters. Id. at 97; see also WASH. REV.
CODE § 88.46.040(3) (1994) (directing the Office of Marine Safety to develop oil tanker standards);

WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 317-21-130, 317-21-200-265 (1999) (providing requirements for oil
tankers operating in Washington waters); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 88.46.070, 88.46.080, 88.46.090
(establishing possible sanctions for violating the operating requirements).
163. See Locke, 529 U.S. at 98 (citing Int'l Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Lowry, 947 F.
Supp. 1484 (W.D. Wash. 1996), and Int'l Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Locke, 148 F.3d 1053
(1998)).
164. Locke, 529 U.S. at 99, 117.
165. 33 U.S.C. § 2718 (2000).
166. Locke, 529 U.S. at 105.
167. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1223(a)(1) (2000).
168. Locke, 529 U.S. at 107.
169. Id. at 108.
170. Id. at 112-17.
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state was attempting to avoid, but he maintained that the Court had to
focus on "political responsibility," and he made no effort to determine
whether the federal laws alone provided adequate protection to the
marine environment. '71
C. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island
In 2001, Kennedy issued his sixth environmental law majority
opinion, writing for a 5-4 majority that faulted the Rhode Island
Supreme Court's rejection of Anthony Palazzolo's takings claim
concerning the state's denial of his plans to develop his coastal property
by filling wetlands. 72 The Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's rejection of Palazzolo's argument that the state's wetland
regulations worked a taking of his property because 1) his claim was not
ripe, 2) he had no right to challenge regulations that pre-dated his
acquisition of the site, 73 and 3) the uplands on his property remained
74
developable, thus leaving Palazzolo with substantial economic value.'

171. Id. at 117 ("When one contemplates the weight and immense mass of oil ever in transit by
tankers, the oil's proximity to coastal life, and its destructive power even if a spill occurs far upon
the open sea, international, federal, and state regulation may be insufficient protection. Sufficiency,
however, is not the question before us.").
172. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 611-14 (2001). The wetlands were actually a salt
marsh subject to tidal flooding. Id. at 606.
173. Palazzolo's corporation actually acquired the site in the 1950s, before enactment of the
state's wetland regulations. But, by the time the state dissolved the corporation in 1978 (because of
tax delinquency), and title passed to Palazzolo as an individual, the state's wetland regulations were
in effect. See id. at 613-14.
174. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 746 A.2d 707, 714, 717 (R.I. 2000). The court reached its
conclusion that Palazzolo's takings claim was not ripe because he had never applied for a permit to
develop the seventy-four lot subdivision he used as the basis for his claim. Nor had he applied to
develop the land in a manner that would involve less intensive filling of wetlands.
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Writing for a fractured Court, 75 Justice Kennedy reversed on the
ripeness and pre-existing regulation grounds. 176 As in Del Monte
Dunes,177 Palazzolo had submitted multiple unsuccessful applications,
and because of the "unequivocal nature" of the state's regulations,
Kennedy concluded that submission of further development plans would
have been futile, and therefore the suit was ripe. 178 Moreover, the
majority overturned the state court rule barring a takings challenge
because of regulations pre-dating the landowner's acquisition of the
property, declaring that "[t]he State may not put so potent a Hobbesian
stick into the Lockean bundle."' 79 Thus, the Court rejected the so-called

175. Although Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion, both Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia filed separate concurring
opinions. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 610. Justice O'Connor's concurrence emphasized that the Court's
holding that post-regulatory acquisition of a property did not automatically bar a takings claim
should not be interpreted to mean that the prior existence of the regulation was not relevant to
whether a taking occurred within the framework of Penn Centralbalancing (see infra note 182 and
accompanying text), as evidence of the regulation's effect on both investment-backed expectations
and the character of the government action. Palazzolo at 633-34 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice
Scalia's concurrence objected to this notion that an existing regulation should be considered as part
of the investment-backed expectation inquiry because, in his opinion, Penn Central balancing
"should have no bearing" in determining whether there was a "total taking." Id. at 637 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). See infra note 182.
Justice Stevens joined the majority opinion in its determination that the takings claim was ripe
because the regulations at issue prohibited any development of the wetlands. But because Palazzolo
gained title to the property only after the regulations had become effective, Stevens thought he
lacked standing to challenge regulations pre-dating his ownership of the property. Palazzolo, 533
U.S. at 642-43 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Ginsburg filed a
dissent, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, disagreeing with Justice Kennedy's ripeness
conclusion. She agreed with the Rhode Island Supreme Court that Palazzolo's takings claim was not
ripe because he had never sought to develop only the upland portion of the property that was not
affected by the state wetlands regulations. Id. at 647 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer filed a
separate dissent to note that while acquisition of a parcel of land after the adoption of restrictive
zoning regulations may not automatically bar a takings claim, that fact should be evaluated using
Penn Central balancing, endorsing Justice O'Connor's conclusion. Id. at 655 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
176. Id. at 618-30.
177. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999), supra
note 107 and accompanying text.
178. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 619; see also id. at 625-26 ("Where the state agency charged with
enforcing a challenged land-use regulation entertains an application from an owner and its denial of
the application makes clear the extent of development permitted. . . federal ripeness rules do not
require the submission of further and futile applications ....").
179. Id. at 627. See infra note 302 (describing the meaning of "Hobbesian"). For an insightful
reexamination of property as a bundle of rights, including rights of the state, see Myrl L. Duncan,
Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks: Land as a Community-Based Resource, 32 ENVTL. L. 773
(2002).
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"notice rule," by which government defendants could categorically
defeat takings claims where the landowner acquired the property after
promulgation of the restrictive regulation. 80 According to Justice
Kennedy, the proper inquiry for takings purposes was whether a
landowner's predecessor could have successfully maintained a takings
claim.' 81 This position did not represent a majority of the Court,
however, as Justice O'Connor's concurrence emphasized that landowner
notice of existing regulations was a highly relevant factor in determining
both the reasonableness of a landowner's investment-backed
expectations and the regulation's economic effect under 82
the Court's
dominant takings test, the so-called Penn Central balancing.'
The result proved to be a Pyrrhic victory for the landowner, for
Justice Kennedy did not disturb the Rhode Island Supreme Court's
ruling that Palazzolo retained substantial value in the unregulated upland

180. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628 ("A blanket rule that purchasers with notice have no
compensation right when a claim becomes ripe is too blunt an instrument to accord with the duty to
compensate what is taken."). On the so-called notice rule, see Danaya C. Wright, A New Time For
Denominators: Toward A Dynamic Theory Of PropertyIn The Regulatory Takings Relevant Parcel
Analysis, 34 ENVTL. L. 175, 188-90 (2004); Steven J. Eagle, The Regulatory Takings Notice Rule,
24 U. HAW. L. REV. 533, 534 (2002); Michael C. Blumm, Palazzolo and the Decline of Justice
Scalia's CategoricalTakings Doctrine, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 137, 143-47 (2002).
181. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627 ("Were we to accept the State's rule, the postenactment transfer
of title would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action restricting land use, no matter
how extreme or unreasonable. A State would be allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on the
Takings Clause. This ought not to be the rule. Future generations, too, have a right to challenge
unreasonable limitations on the use and value of land.").
182. Id. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Penn Central balancing test was inaugurated by
Justice Brennan's opinion in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104
(1978). See Lazarus, supra note 55, at 767-72 (discussing how the Court developed the Penn
Central test); Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporationand the
Roots of the Takings "'Muddle",90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 875-82 (2006) (tracing how the historic
trend of construing substantive due process claims as takings contributed to the Penn Central
result); Eric R. Clacys, The Penn Central Test and Tensions in Liberal Property Theory, 30 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 339 (2006) (discussing how different Supreme Court justices have adapted the Penn
Central test to reach desired conclusions); John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23
U.C.L.A. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 171 (2005) (explaining why the widespread benefits of a
government program and whether it attempts to prevent nuisance-like activity are relevant factors in
Penn Central balancing).
Justice Scalia, also in the majority, wrote a separate concurrence largely criticizing Justice
O'Connor's approach, and suggesting the pre-existing notice of regulatory restrictions should have
no effect on whether a regulation worked a taking, except where it formed a "background principle"
of state property law, so that a Penn Centraltakings claim would be unaffected by transfers of title.
Id. at 636-37 (Scalia, J., concurring). See Lazarus, supra note 55 at 817 (stating that Justice Scalia
wrote his separate concurrence in Palazzolo for the "purpose of taking deliberate and harsh aim at
O'Connor").
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portion of his property. 183 Consequently, the Court remanded the case to
the Rhode Island courts to determine whether the wetlands regulation
worked a Penn Central-type taking. 184 Palazzolo was unsuccessful in
this effort. 185 Nevertheless, although Palazzolo was unable to destroy the
wetlands in pursuit of his proposed development, Justice Kennedy's
opinion was largely favorable to the landowner because it relaxed
ripeness rules, eliminated the regulatory notice as a categorical
governmental defense, and demonstrated considerable
suspicion of the
186
regulations.
environmental
state's "Hobbesian"
D. Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA
2004 witnessed the only dissent Justice Kennedy wrote among the
eighty environmental cases in this survey. At issue was whether the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) could issue Clean Air Act
compliance orders against the state of Alaska to stop the construction of
a polluting facility after the EPA concluded that the state's determination
of "best available control technology" (BACT) to reduce plant emissions
was unreasonable.' 87 EPA and the states make BACT determinations on
a case-by-case basis, considering energy, environmental, and economic

183. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632. The regulation had not eliminated all value of Palazzolo's
property, as it was worth an estimated $200,000 with the regulation (although nearly $3.2 million
without the regulation). Justice Kennedy wrote that under these circumstances, there was no Lucastype taking because Palazzolo retained more than a "token interest," and the regulation did not leave
the land "economically idle." Id. at 631.
184. Id. at 630.
185. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 785 A.2d 561 (R.I. 2001). Following the Court's decision, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court remanded the case to the state superior court to analyze the takings
claim under Penn Central. Id. at 561. The superior court concluded that the proposed development's
negative effects on nearby Winnapaug Pond constituted a public nuisance. Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at *5 (R.I. Super. 2005). Further, because one half of
Palazzolo's property fell below the mean high tide line, under the state's public trust doctrine, the
state holds these lands in trust for the public. Id. at *6-7. Thus, Palazzolo had no right to fill any
wetlands below the mean high tide line without state legislative permission, significantly
diminishing any reasonable investment-backed expectations he might have had for developing the
property. Id. at *12-14.
186. See supra notes 178 (ripeness), 180 (notice rule), 179 (Hobbesian state power) and
accompanying text.
187. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461,468 (2004). Under the Clean Air
Act's "Prevention of Significant Deterioration" program for airsheds in compliance with national
ambient air quality standards, construction of any facility resulting in "major" emissions must be
equipped with BACT. Id.
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factors.' 88 Each state administers its own EPA-approved clean air
program, but EPA has enforcement authority as well, and the Clean Air
Act authorizes EPA to take remedial action against any state not in
compliance with the statute, including issuing "an order prohibiting the
construction."' 189 EPA invoked this authority to prevent the Alaska state
agency from issuing a permit to the facility, alleging that the stateprescribed BACT measures were unreasonable. 90 The state maintained
that under the Clean Air Act, only a19 state has the authority to decide
which technology is "best available."' '
A five-member Court majority, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg,
sided with EPA, even though it refused to give Chevron deference to
EPA guidance documents. 92 Nonetheless, the Court considered EPA's
interpretation of its enforcement authority to be reasonable, based on an
administrative record that showed the state's BACT would produce
considerably more emissions than alternative technology, and that
included no evidence indicating that such an alternative was
economically infeasible.' 93
Justice Kennedy, for a four-member dissent that included Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, thought that the EPA
lacked authority to take enforcement action against a state exercising its

188. See id. at 468 (citing Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2000)).
189. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(5)(A). See also id. § 7477 ("prevention of significant deterioration"
provision also authorizing EPA to issue "an order.., to prevent the construction... of a
facility .... that does not meet PSD requirements).
190. See Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 540 U.S. at 474, 480 (describing the exchanges in
the permitting process for the Red Dog Mine, a zinc concentrate mine 100 miles north of the Arctic
Circle, which led to EPA's 1999 order).
191. See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (defining "best available control technology" to mean "an emission
limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant subject to
regulation ... which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy,
environmental, and economic impacts and other costs, determines is achievable for such facility
through application of production processes and available methods, systems, and techniques,
including fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques for
control of each such pollutant").
192. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 540 U.S. at 487. Under Chevron v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), courts give deference to reasonable agency interpretations of
statutory ambiguities if regulations are promulgated as part of a public accessible process, like
notice and comment rulemaking. In this case, the Court accorded EPA's guidance only "respect," as
called for by Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) and United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237-38 (2001).
193. Alaska Dep't ofEnvtl. Conservation, 540 U.S. at 501-02.
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statutory discretion. 194 Instead, he believed that the EPA should have
challenged the state's BACT determination in state proceedings. 95 He
also charged the majority with giving the EPA interpretation
inappropriate deference, maintaining that the majority "opinion is chockfull of Chevron-like language."' t 96 In Kennedy's judgment, the majority
abrogated the cooperative federalism scheme Congress constructed in
the Clean Air Act. He declared that "federal agencies cannot consign
States to the ministerial tasks of information gathering and making initial
recommendations, while reserving to themselves the authority to make
final judgments under the guise of surveillance and oversight."' 97
The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation decision is a
telling one. Justice Kennedy not only issued his only written dissent in
an environmental case, 198 but he also departed from his fellow centrist,
Justice O'Connor, which was a rare event' 9 9 Moreover, while the case
turned on the intricacies of a complex federal statute, one would have
thought that those intricacies supported the respect the majority gave to
the agency charged with the administration of the statute, even if
Chevron deference was inappropriate. Further, the text of the Clean Air
Act twice authorized the EPA to enforce against non-complying states
and facilities. 200 But neither that text, nor the statute's complexity
mattered as much to Justice Kennedy as his conception of the federalstate balance implicit in the statute's structure. Although quick to find
federal preemption of state tanker safety and hazardous waste worker
training requirements, 2° 1 and willing to strike down a local recycling
ordinance as an unconstitutional interference with interstate

194. Id. at 503 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 509.
196. Id. at 517.
197. Id. at 518.
198. Professor Lazarus, the closest observer of the Court's environmental law opinions, considers
Justice Kennedy "the most significant Justice in environmental cases, at least to the extent that he
has been in the majority more often than any other Justice, often providing the decisive fifth vote."
Richard J. Lazarus, Human Nature, the Laws of Nature, and the Nature of Environmental Law, 24
VA. ENVTL. L. J. 231,250 (2006).

199. Of the cases we consider in this study, O'Connor and Kennedy agreed in sixty-seven of the
seventy-five cases in which both participated, or eighty-nine percent of the time. These statistics
count only agreement with the majority or the dissent, not separate concurrences.
200. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 162-171 (discussing United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000)), notes 7980 (discussing Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992)) and accompanying
text.
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commerce, 20 2 Kennedy seemed to see in the Clean Air Act a kind of
"reverse preemption" in which state action foreclosed federal action. He
accused the majority of taking "a great step backward in Congress'
design to grant States a significant20 3stake in developing and enforcing
national environmental objectives.
E. Kennedy and the Environment in 2000-2004
Justice Kennedy's decisions in the early 2000s did not represent a
sharp deviation from the path he set in his first years on the Court,20 4 as
he continued to maintain his nuanced approach. He remained willing to
preempt state legislation to prevent perceived overregulation,0 5 and he
continued to encourage takings claims by reducing ripeness barriers and
eliminating government defenses based on notice of existing
regulations.20 6 But, he managed to defeat most takings claims by
endorsing a large view of the property in Palazzolo,2°7 a view
subsequently confirmed by the Court in a later case.20 8 In what is
probably the most revealing case of his early twenty-first century
jurisprudence, Justice Kennedy made clear in his Alaska Department of
Environmental Conservation dissent that states' rights were more
important to him than environmental protection, at least when the latter
involved more than one level of governmental regulation. 20 9 This case
shows that Kennedy's priority in doubtful cases is not environmental

202. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text (discussing C & A Carbone v. Town of
Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994)).
203. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 516 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
204. A possible exception is Kennedy's suggestion in his Laidlaw concurrence that
congressionally authorized civil penalties in citizen suits might offend the Executive's privileges
under Article 11of the Constitution. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 193, 197 (2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring), discussed supra notes 159-160 and
accompanying text.
205. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 105-16, discussed supra notes 161-171
accompanying text.

and

206. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 625-27 (2001), discussed supra notes 175-181.
207. Id. at 632, discussed supranote 183 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's refusal to
conceptually sever Palazzolo's wetlands from his uplands).
208. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326-327 & n.23
(2002) (endorsing the "parcel as a whole" rule and quoting from Justice O'Connor's concurrence in

Palazzolo and Justice Brennan's opinion in Penn Central).
209. See Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 516-18 (2004), discussed
supranotes 187-203 and accompanying text.
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protection
but preservation of state autonomy. And he is strident about
0
21

it.

IV.

DECISIONS OF 2005-2006

In recent years, Justice Kennedy saw his view that the takings clause
was an inappropriate vehicle for substantive challenges to governmental
regulation vindicated by the Court. 211 He also became the deciding vote
both in the Court's affirmation of governmental authority to condemn
land for economic development, 12 and in its decision to limit regulation
21
of wetlands not sufficiently connected to navigable waters, although
the latter decision raised many more questions than it answered.2 14 In all
of these cases, Kennedy's fidelity to fact-based decisionmaking
remained evident.
A. Lingle v. Chevron
Of the two celebrated property rights cases of the 2004 Supreme
Court term, Lingle v. Chevron received decidedly less press attention
than Kelo v. City of New London, although it is not clear that the result is
less significant. Lingle concerned a Hawaiian statute enacted in response
to the state's highly concentrated gasoline market that produced
extremely high consumer prices. 21 5 The statute capped the maximum
rent an oil company could charge dealers leasing its service stations.26
Chevron, one of only six wholesalers in the state, claimed the statute
prevented it from recovering its expenses and failed to "substantially

210. Professor Lazarus, supra note 198 at 250, observed that Kennedy's Alaska Department of
Environmental Conservation dissent "relied on remarkably strident rhetoric." Lazarus suggested
that Kennedy's dissent erred by not considering the reasons for congressional distrust of state
regulation in the Clean Air Act: thus, "what Justice Kennedy perceived as a problem may have been
better understood as a solution." Id. at 251.
and
211. See Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005), discussed infra notes 215-226
accompanying text.
212. See Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490-93 (2005), discussed infra notes 227-237 and
accompanying text.
213. See Rapanos v. United States, U.S.- (June 19, 2006), 126 S.Ct. 2208, 2236-52 (2006),
discussed infra notes 240-254 and accompanying text.
214. See, e.g., infra note 246 (discussing post-Rapanos cases).
215. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 533 (citing 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws page no. 257).
216. Id.
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advance" a legitimate state interest, 2 17 a showing that the Supreme Court
seemed to require the government to demonstrate in its 1980 Agins v.
Tiburon decision. 218 Chevron challenged the regulation, the district court
twice ruled in favor of the oil company, and the Ninth Circuit twice
all upholding the relevance of the "substantially advances"
affirmed,
9
21

test.

Somewhat surprisingly, a unanimous Supreme Court repudiated the

"substantially

advances"

test

for

regulatory

takings. 220

Justice

O'Connor's opinion for the Court denied that the test had any "proper
place

in our takings jurisprudence.,

221

The test's

focus on the

effectiveness of a governmental regulation was, she maintained, actually
a due process clause test, which was "logically prior to and distinct
from" whether its effect produced too great a burden on an individual
property holder.222
217. See id. at 534.
218. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980) (holding that a landowner's takings
claim failed because the ordinances at issue substantially advanced a legitimate state interest by
protecting residents from the "ill effects" of urbanization).
219. After the district court initially ruled in Chevron's favor, the state appealed to the Ninth
Circuit, challenging the "substantially advances" test. The appeals court affirmed on the
appropriateness of the standard, although it remanded as to its application. Chevron v. Cayetano,
224 F.3d 1030, 1042 (9th Cir. 2000). The district court then concluded that the statute was
unconstitutional by failing to advance a legitimate state interest, because the effect of the statute
would be to actually increase gasoline prices, not lower them. The Ninth Circuit again affirmed,
upholding the use of the "substantially advances" test. Chevron v. Bronster, 363 F.3d 846, 849 (9th
Cir. 2004).
220. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540. Justice Kennedy had been complaining about the Agins
"substantially advances" test as early as Lucas, when he argued in conference that the "Agins
language is not correct and has to be explained." See Percival, supra note 70, at 10,654-55 (citing
Notes of Justice Blackmun (Feb. 29, 1992 & Mar. 1, 1992), Harry A. Blackmun Papers, box 599).
221. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540. The Court made an exception to the statement in the text for land
use exactions, such as those involved in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994)
(requiring a "rough proportionality" between the effect of proposed developments and requirements
to dedicate land for public purposes), discussed supra notes 117-118.
According to Justice O'Connor, the purpose of regulatory takings jurisprudence is to identify
regulatory actions that are "functionally equivalent" to physical takings of property by focusing on
"the severity of the burden" the regulation imposes on private property. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.
222. Id. at 543. This conclusion vindicated longstanding arguments by John Echeverria. See John
D. Echeverria, Takings and Errors, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1047, 1050 (2000) (criticizing the
"substantially advances" test as the source of error in takings decisions, and analogizing the test to
Due Process Clause means-ends analysis); John D. Echeverria, Does a Regulation That Fails to
Advance a Legitimate Governmental Interest Result in a Regulatory Taking?, 29 ENVTL. L. 853
(1999) (arguing the "substantially advances" test has no place in takings analysis); John D.
Echeverria & Sharon Dennis, The Takings Issue and the Due Process Clause. A Way Out of a
Doctrinal Confusion, 17 VT. L. REV. 695, 716 (1993) (arguing for the establishment of a new
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Justice Kennedy wrote a concurrence to emphasize that the Court's
abandonment of the "substantially advances" test for a regulatory taking
did not preclude the possibility that "a regulation might be so arbitrary or
irrational as to violate due process," citing his Eastern Enterprises
concurrence.2 23 His Lingle concurrence was a reminder that Kennedywhose puzzling Laidlaw concurrence indicated an evident hostility to
governmental control 2 24-was more than willing to erect a new era of
substantive due process review, in which federal courts would police the
wisdom of local land use regulations. Justice Kennedy's apparent
moderation in the takings context 225 hardly seems evident outside that
context. 226 Upon close inspection, Kennedy seems more of a regulatory
skeptic than a moderate.
B. Kelo v. City of New London
Far more celebrated (or notorious) than Lingle was the well-known
Kelo decision, which inspired a widespread political revolt.22 7 Kelo

involved the question of whether condemnation for private economic
development can qualify as a public use. The city of New London,

takings standard distinct from due process analysis). For a detailed analysis of Lingle and its
significance, see Robert G. Dreher, Lingle's Legacy: Untangling Substantive Due Process From
Takings Doctrine, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 371 (2006) (maintaining that by removing any
substantive due process element from takings inquiries, Lingle heralded a new narrow vision of
takings analysis).
concurring). On his Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524
223. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548 (Kennedy, J.,
U.S. 498 (1998), concurrence, see supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 159-160 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 174-186 (discussing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001)) and
accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 187-203 (discussing Alaska Dep't of Envt' Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S.
461 (2004)) and 215-225 (discussing Lingle, 544 U.S. 528) and accompanying text.
227. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). See Timothy Sandefur The "'Backlash"
So Far: Will Americans Get Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform? 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 709
(summarizing legislation passed in more than twenty states in response to Kelo to restrict eminent
domain powers); Eric Claeys, That '70s Show: Eminent Domain Reform and the Administrative
Law Revolution, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 867 (2006) (urging states to amend eminent domain
statutes to require heightened means-ends scrutiny); Bernard W. Bell, Legislatively Revising Kelo v.
City of New London: Eminent Domain, Federalism,and CongressionalPowers, 32 J. LEGIS. 165
(2006) (discussing ways Congress could restrict states' ability to exercise eminent domain power);
Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Banning
Economic Development Takings, 29 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 491 (2006) (calling on states to
amend their constitutions to bar the use of eminent domain for economic development); see also
supranote 6, discussing commentary about Justice Kennedy's role in Kelo.
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Connecticut-which had purchased most of the land necessary for a
redevelopment project in an economically depressed area-decided to
condemn fifteen "holdout" properties as part of its plan to revitalize an
ailing economy.2 28 Unlike most condemnations, however, much of the
condemned land here would be used for private residential and
commercial use, including a resort hotel and conference center.229
The holdouts filed suit in Connecticut court, challenging this use of
the eminent domain authority. The trial court granted relief as to some
parcels, but the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, ruling that all the
230
condemnations were permissible public uses and in the public interest.
A fractured Court upheld the city's plan on a 5-4 vote. 231 The majority
opinion, written by Justice Stevens, decided that the city's determination
that the neighborhood warranted an economic revitalization program
deserved a high degree of judicial deference.232 According to Justice
Stevens, the city's carefully considered development plan ensured that
there would be no illegitimate taking of property from one owner to
another without a public benefit.23 3
Justice Kennedy's concurrence supplied the deciding vote in the
case. 234 He did not share the majority's position concerning deference to

228. Most of the properties necessary to carry out the city's plan were acquired by purchase; only
a few required condemnation. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475. The city was clearly authorized under state law
to condemn land-even if it was already developed-for economic development if it were for a
"public use" and in the "public interest." Kelo, 545 U.S. at 476 (citing CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 8-186 et
seq. (2005)).
229. See Peggy Cosgrove, New London Development Corporation (prepared for the American
Assembly),
at
5,
available
at
http://www.clairegaudiani.com/Writings/documents/NLDCCaseStudy.pdf.
230. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 527-28, 543 (Conn. 2004) (relying on Berman
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (upholding condemnation for urban redevelopment) and Hawaii
Housing Auth. v. Midkiff 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (upholding condemnation to break up a land
oligopoly)).
231. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 470.
232. Id. at 483.
233. Id. ("The City has carefully formulated a development plan that it believes will provide
appreciable benefits to the community, including-but by no means limited to-new jobs and
increased tax revenue.").
234. Justice O'Connor wrote for the four-member dissent that included Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and Thomas. She thought the majority had taken her opinion in Midkiff
(upholding the use of eminent domain to break up a land oligopoly) too far in authorizing eminent
domain for economic development, "[since] nearly any lawful use of real private property can be
said to generate some incidental benefit to the public." Id. at 501 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She
would restrict its use to programs aimed at curing "public harms," like blight (as in Berman) and
land oligopoly (as in Midkiff). Without such limits, she predicted that "[tihe beneficiaries are likely
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the city; instead he suggested the need for heightened judicial scrutiny of
certain declarations of public use to guard against condemnations that
"favor a particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public
benefits. 2 35 In cases of possible impermissible favoritism to private
parties, Kennedy called for "a careful and extensive inquiry" into
whether the development plan would satisfy what amounted to a sevenfactor test. 236 This fact-intensive inquiry seemed to be an effort to
transform the minimum scrutiny advocated by the plurality into
something approaching intermediate judicial scrutiny-what Kennedy
referred to as "meaningful rational basis review., 237 The result was
consistent with his interest in reviving substantive due process review,
evidenced in Apfel, 238 and his fidelity to fact-based determinations,
epitomized in Coeur d'Alene,2 39 among other opinions.
C. Rapanos v. United States
The final decision in this study was the most closely watched
environmental law case of the Court's 2005 term. Again, Justice
Kennedy supplied the deciding vote. The controversy concerned two
cases involving four Michigan wetlands, all lying near ditches or manmade drains that emptied into traditionally navigable waters. In one case,
the government brought an enforcement action against a developer who
filled without a permit; 240 in the other, the government denied the

to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including
large corporations and development firms. As for the victims," she claimed that "the government
now has license to transfer property from those with fewer resources to those with more." Id. at 505.
Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissent on originalist grounds. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
236. Id. at 491-92 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (calling for investigation as to whether 1) the
primary beneficiaries of the plan were the developer and private businesses; 2) there were more than
incidental benefits to the city; 3) there was evidence of depressed economic conditions; 4) there was
a substantial commitment of public funds before identifying most of the private beneficiaries; 5) the
government reviewed several alternative development plans; 6) the government selected the
developer from a variety of competitors, not one identified beforehand; and 7) the private
beneficiaries were identified beforehand).
237. Id. at 492. Kennedy suggested that the trigger for this more stringent standard of review was
when the "risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties is so acute that a
presumption (rebuttable or otherwise) of invalidity is warranted under the Public Use Clause." Id. at
493.
238. See supranotes 104-106 and accompanying text.
239. See supranotes 87-100 and accompanying text.
240. See United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 632-33 (6th Cir. 2004).
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developer a permit.2 4 1 In both cases, different district courts concluded
that there was federal jurisdiction over the fills. 242 The Sixth Circuit
affirmed because one of the cases involved wetlands "adjacent" to
navigable waters, and the other involved a wetland that had a
hydrological connection to a navigable water.24 3

241. See Carabell v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 391 F.3d 704, 705-07 (6th Cir. 2004).
242. See Carabell, 391 F.3d at 707; Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 634.
243. Carabell, 391 F.3d at 709-10 (affirming a lower court decision upholding a Corps decision
not to grant a permit to fill a wetland that was adjacent to a tributary to navigable waters); Rapanos,
376 F.3d at 629 (affirming the district court decision that held that a developer was required to
apply for a permit to fill several wetlands).
Under the Clean Water Act (CWA), landowners are prohibited from discharging fill into the
"navigable waters" without first obtaining a permit from the Corps. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006). For
the purposes of the CWA, "navigable waters" include a much greater scope of waters than
navigable-in-fact waterways, as the CWA defines the term to encompass "waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). And, the statute's legislative history
indicated that the term should be construed to the fullest extent of federal Commerce Clause
jurisdiction. See S. CONF. REP. No. 92-1236 at 2 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776,
3821 (amending the original Senate bill to define the term "navigable waters"); S. REP. No. 92-414
at 2 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3773 (calling for enlarging the federal role in
water pollution control to include navigable waters, groundwater, and waters of the contiguous
zone).

The Corps and EPA issued substantively identical longstanding regulations defining the scope of
"waters of the United States" for purposes of CWA jurisdiction to include: "(1) All waters which
are currently used, or were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign
commerce, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide; (2) All interstate
waters including interstate wetlands; (3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams
(including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet
meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect
interstate or foreign commerce ... (4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of
the United States under the definition; (5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(1)
through (4) of this section; (6) The territorial seas; (7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than
waters that are themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a)(]) through (6) of this section." 33
C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2006) (the Corps' regulations); see also 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2007) (the EPA
regulations).
These regulations have been the source of a number of recent challenges to the Corps'
jurisdiction over wetlands, most notably in Solid Waste Agency of Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159 (2001), where the Supreme Court invalidated
Corps' jurisdiction over so-called "isolated" waters that provide habitat for migratory birds (the
Migratory Bird Rule). Id. at 174. Lower courts have split over how broadly the holding in SWANCC
applies. The Fifth Circuit narrowly construed the scope of Corps' jurisdiction by requiring findings
that a wetland is "truly" adjacent to a jurisdictional water. See In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340,
345-46 (5th Cir. 2003). Other circuits interpreted SWANCC to have no limiting effect on Corps'
wetlands jurisdiction beyond invalidating the Migratory Bird Rule. See Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 638.
As the Sixth Circuit noted in Carabell, SWANCC did not overrule the Supreme Court's earlier
decision upholding Corps' jurisdiction over "adjacent wetlands" in United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 135 (1985). See Carabell, 391 F.3d at 709.
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A divided Supreme Court split 4-1-4. Characteristically, Justice
Kennedy was the pivotal vote. Justice Scalia's opinion for a fourmember plurality would have swept away thirty years of consistent
Clean Water Act (CWA) interpretation, relying on a 1954 dictionary to
conclude that federal jurisdiction was restricted to "those relatively
permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water 'forming

geographic features' that are described in ordinary parlance as
'streams[,] ...oceans, rivers, [and] lakes."', 244 This interpretation would
have precluded federal regulation of intermittent or ephemeral bodies of

water that are not permanent or continuously flowing-characteristic of
many Western streams-in the service of the plurality's view of
protecting state and local authority allegedly threatened by federal CWA
jurisdiction.245
But, Justice Kennedy-whose opinion was controlling, as Chief
Justice Roberts made clear2 46-- was unwilling to rely on a half-century
old dictionary to resolve such an important question of federal
jurisdiction. Instead, he concluded that the Sixth Circuit correctly

244. Rapanos v. United States, _ U.S. __ (June 19, 2006), 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2225 (2006) (quoting
WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 2882 (2d ed. 1954)). Justice Scalia wrote for himself, Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito. See id. at 2214.
245. Id. at 2225.
246. Id. at 2236 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (noting that "[I]ower courts and regulated entities will
now have to feel their way on a case-by-case basis," but "[t]his situation is certainly not
unprecedented" under Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977), "[w]hen a fragmented
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices,
'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in
the judgments on the narrowest grounds ... " (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n. 15
(1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). Lower courts are now wrestling with what to
make of the rule in Rapanos.
One of the first post-Rapanos district courts to reach a wetlands jurisdictional determination
interpreted the fragmented decision to indicate that courts should find Corps' jurisdiction if a
wetland meets either Kennedy's "significant nexus" standard or the plurality's "continuous surface
connection" test. See United States v. Evans, No. 3:05CR159J32HTS, 2006 WL 2221629, at *2021 (M.D. Fla. 2006). The First Circuit agreed in United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir.
2006) (either the Rapanos plurality's test or Kennedy's test is sufficient for federal jurisdiction).
But, both the Ninth and Seventh Circuits upheld federal jurisdiction based only on Kennedy's test.
N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, No. 04-15442, - F.3d __,2007 WL 2230186 (9th Cir.
2007) (applying Justice Kennedy's "significant nexus" test to determine jurisdiction over a pond
adjacent to a river, and finding that "nexus" in the form of a surface connection between water
seeping over a man-man levee from the pond into the river as well as the fact that the pond water
significantly affects the physical, biological, and chemical integrity of the adjacent river); United
States v. Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2006) (employing Kennedy's test as "the
least common denominator," because the court thought it would be a "rare case" where the Rapanos
plurality and dissent would both find jurisdiction but Justice Kennedy would not).
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determined that a wetland is subject to federal jurisdiction if it possessed
a "significant nexus" to navigable waters, but that the appeals court had
failed to consider all the factors necessary to ascertain whether the
wetland in fact had the requisite nexus.247 Kennedy claimed that "in
most cases regulation of wetlands that are adjacent to tributaries and
possess a significant nexus with navigable waters will raise no serious
constitutional or federalism difficulty," adding that "[t]he possibility of
legitimate Commerce Clause and federalism concerns in some
circumstances does not require the adoption of an interpretation that
departs in all cases from the Act's text and structure. 248
Kennedy's concurrence had much more in common with Justice
Stevens's dissent, which called for judicial deference to longstanding
249
and reasonable

administrative practice,

than with the plurality.

Kennedy even referred to the plurality opinion as "inconsistent with the
Act's text, structure and purpose," a rather curious conclusion in a
concurrence. 25 He spelled out the "significant nexus" test he called for
in the following terms:
[W]etlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus come within the
statutory phrase "navigable waters," if the wetlands either alone
or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region,

247. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2236 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist first brought
the phrase "significant nexus" into the Court's wetlands jurisprudence when he wrote in his
SWANCC opinion that "[lit was the significant nexus between the wetlands and 'navigable waters'
that informed our reading of the CWA in Riverside Bayview Homes." SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167.
248. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2249-50. Kennedy seemed to have exempted wetlands adjacent to
navigable waters from his "significant nexus" showing: "As applied to wetlands adjacent to
navigable-in-fact waters, the Corps' conclusive standard for jurisdiction rests upon a reasonable
inference ecologic interconnection, and the assertion of jurisdiction for those wetlands is sustainable
under the Act by showing adjacency alone. That is the holding of Riverside Bayview." Id. at 2248.
249. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2252-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens wrote for himself
and Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. at 2252.
250. Id. at 2246. Moreover, Kennedy noted that because "the dissent is correct to observe that an
intermittent flow can constitute a stream,... [iut follows that the Corps can reasonably interpret the
Act to cover the paths of such impermanent streams." Id. at 2243. Also, he observed that the
plurality's conclusion that navigable waters may not be intermittent was "unsound." Id. at 2243.
And, he agreed with the dissent that "the fact that point sources may carry continuous flow
undermines the plurality's conclusion that covered 'waters' under the Act may not be
discontinuous." Id. at 2243. Finally, he rejected the plurality's exclusion of wetlands lacking a
continuous surface connection to other jurisdictional waters. Id. at 2244. See also Donald Kennedy
& Brook Hanson, What's a Wetland, Anyhow?, 313 SCIENCE no. 5790, at 1019 (Aug. 25, 2006)
(criticizing Justice Scalia for looking to a dictionary, rather than to contemporary environmental
science-as Justice Kennedy did-in ascertaining the scope of federal wetlands jurisdiction in
Rapanos).
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significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as
"navigable." When, in contrast, wetlands' effects on water
quality are speculative or insubstantial, they fall outside the zone
fairly encompassed by the statutory term "navigable waters. 251
Kennedy faulted existing Corps regulations for their "overbreadth"
and called for new regulations concerning wetlands that are adjacent to
tributaries of navigable waters, to ensure the requisite ecological
connection.252 Pending the promulgation of such regulations, the Corps
would have to make jurisdictional determinations on a case-by-case
basis.253
Kennedy did not conclude that the wetlands at issue in Rapanos were
beyond regulatory reach. In fact, he suggested that they were probably
jurisdictional wetlands, noting that "the record contains evidence
suggesting the possible existence of a significant nexus according to the
principles outlined above. Thus the end result in these cases and many
others to be considered by the Corps may be the same as that suggested
by the dissent." 254 Why, in light of these sentiments, Kennedy concurred
in the plurality opinion was not at all clear.
D. Kennedy's EnvironmentalRecord, 2005-2006
Justice Kennedy's recent
those carefully studying his
takings clause should not be
of legislation, first articulated

decisions should come as no surprise to
environmental record. His view that the
invoked to question the substantive merits
in Eastern Enterprises,255 finally prevailed

251. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2248.
252. Id. at 2248-49 (calling for the Corps "to identify categories of tributaries that, due to their

volume of flow (either annually or on average), their proximity to navigable waters, or other
relevant considerations, are significant enough that wetlands adjacent to them are likely, in the
majority of cases, to perform important functions for an aquatic system incorporating navigable
waters.") He specifically approved the Corps' existing regulations concerning wetlands adjacent to
navigable waters because there was "a reasonable inference of ecological interconnection" with
navigable waters. Id. at 2248.
253. Id. at 2249.
254. Id. at 2250. See Bradford C. Mank, Implementing Rapanos-Will Justice Kennedy's
Significant Nexus Test Provide a Workable Standard for Lower Courts, Regulators, and
Developers?, 40 IND. L. REv. 291, 348 (2007) (predicting that the significant nexus test will only
modestly affect the scope of federal jurisdiction because of its emphasis on ecological
considerations, not merely hydrological connections).
255. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S 498, 542, 547-49 (1998), discussed supra notes 101-106 and

accompanying text.
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in Lingle, as the Court reversed itself unanimously.

56

In both Kelo and

Rapanos, Kennedy's concurrences were outcome determinative for a
fractured Court. Characteristically, in Kelo, he called for a multi-factor
test to determine the validity of condemnations for economic
development. 7 In Rapanos, he wanted the government to show the
existence of a significant ecological nexus between wetlands and
navigable waters as a predicate for federal regulation. 58 Such factintensive inquires are, of course, a Kennedy trademark.
V. THE KENNEDY PROFILE
The chronology above illustrates Justice Kennedy's essential role in
environmental cases in the twenty-first century. In the twelve years
between 1988 and 2000, Kennedy wrote only nine environmental law
opinions, or just .75 per year.259 In the six years since 2000, Kennedy
wrote eight environmental law decisions, or 1.3 per year, an increase of
roughly seventy-five percent.2 6 ° Moreover, Kennedy's role is
increasingly determinative: of the twenty post-2000 decisions examined
in this study, five were decided on 5-4 votes, and Kennedy was in the
majority in all but one.2 61 And, of course, Kennedy has written only one
environmental dissent. 62

256. See Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 540, 543 (2005), discussed supra notes 215-226 and
accompanying text.
257. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 491-92 (2005), discussed supra notes 234237.
258. See Rapanos, 126 S.
accompanying text.

Ct. at

1236, 2248-50, discussed supra notes 247-254

and

259. See supra §§ Ill-IV.
260. See supra §§ IV-V.
261. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 610 (2001) (writing for a majority that
included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, and which Justice
Stevens also joined in part); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
531 U.S. 159, 161 (2001) (joining Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority, which was also joined by
Justices Thomas, Scalia, and O'Connor); Kelo, 545 U.S. at 471 (filing a concurring opinion and
joining Justice Stevens's majority opinion, which was also joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer); and Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2214 (concurring in the judgment, but filing a separate
concurring opinion from the plurality authored by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Alito and Thomas). Justice Kennedy's pivotal role in wetlands cases can be also
deduced from the 4-4 result in a California wetlands case from which he had recused himself.
Borden Ranch v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 537 U.S. 99, 100 (2002) (affirming the Ninth
Circuit's decision that EPA had jurisdiction to enforce the CWA when a developer engaged in
"deep ripping"-intensive and very deep plowing through water features-without a permit on a
former ranch with numerous water and wetland features, although that jurisdiction did not extend to
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But, this chronological presentation, while useful in understanding the
development of Justice Kennedy's thinking and in illustrating his
growing importance to the Court's environmental law decisionmaking,
may fail to capture the contributions Justice Kennedy's opinions have
made in discrete areas of environmental law. The four areas to which he
has most prominently contributed are 1) standing and ripeness, 2)
states'-rights federalism, 3) takings, and 4) environmental statutory
interpretation. This section discusses each subject area in turn.
A. Standing and Ripeness
Three standing cases figure prominently in Kennedy's environmental
portfolio: his concurrences in Defenders and Laidlaw and his majority
opinion in Del Monte Dunes.26 3 In Defenders, one of Justice Kennedy's
more telling early opinions, he was unwilling to join in Justice Scalia's
dismissive treatment of the plaintiffs' "animal and vocational nexus"
theories of standing, reserving the right to consider them at a later date,
under other facts.2 64 He also rejected the Scalian proposition that
Congress could not establish standing for new causes of action. 265
In Del Monte Dunes, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion rejected the
application of the more stringent "rough proportionality" test employed
in exaction cases, but upheld the lower court's submission of the takings
266
claim to a jury. 2 6 And, his odd concurrence in Laidlaw suggested that
citizen suits might violate the executive prerogatives contained in Article
II of the Constitution. 67 The Kennedy standing record is thus a mixed
bag---as is the Court's record in general 268-perhaps reflecting his

vernal pools, which the Ninth Circuit determined to be "isolated" wetlands of the type exempted
from CWA jurisdiction in SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)).
262. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 502 (2004), discussed supra
notes 187-203 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 69-77 (Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)), 159-160,
(Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000)), 107-123 (City of
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999)) and accompanying text.
264.
265.
266.
267.

See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes

70-71 and accompanying text.
72-74 and accompanying text.
116-123 and accompanying text.
159-160 and accompanying text.

268. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies-and
Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 663-70 (2006) (discussing the
Supreme Court's use of standing in decisions as a way to avoid undesired remedies); David N.
Cassuto, The Law of Words: Standing, Environment, and Other Contested Terms, 28 HARV. ENVTL.
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reaction to the substantive merits of the underlying environmental claim.
His intimation in Laidlaw about possible limits on Congress's ability to
authorize civil penalties in citizen suits to protect the Executive's Article
II powers has to be of considerable concern for environmental
plaintiffs.26 9
Kennedy's chief ripeness decision was Palazzolo, in which his
majority opinion concluded that rejection of the landowner's repeated
development applications indicated that the state was unlikely to ever
approve his proposed development, and therefore the takings claim was
ripe. 270 Kennedy's Del Monte Dunes majority decision did not disturb a
lower court decision that found the city's numerous denials of a beach
development to be ripe. 271 He clearly is quite interested in removing
ripeness burdens to landowners who submit numerous proposals to local
governments and claim that repeated governmental rejections work
takings.272

Kennedy appears to be fairly evenhanded in his standing and ripeness
decisions. While opposed to setting high hurdles for landowners
claiming takings, he does not adhere to the Scalian common law
model.273 He is willing to entertain animal and vocational nexus theories
of standing, 274 and he believes that Congress has the authority to define

L. REV. 79, 85 (2004) (arguing for a fundamental shift in standing jurisprudence which recognizes
potential injury to the environment as a foundation for standing); Zachary D. Sakas, Footnotes,
Forests, and Fallacy:An Examinationof the Circuit Split RegardingStanding in ProceduralInjuryBased ProgrammaticChallenges, 13 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 175, 180-86 (2006) (discussing trends
in the Court's environmental standing cases).
269. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
271. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 722 (1999) (noting
the "shifting ad hoc restrictions previously imposed by the city" as an example of the "unreasonable
government action" the developer used as the basis of the takings claim). See supra note 112 and
accompanying text.
272. See supranote 178.
273. See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Greening the Constitution: Harmonizing Environmental and
Constitutional Values, 32 ENVTL. L. 809, 869-70 (2002) (discussing Kennedy's Defenders
concurrence as a departure from "Scalia's restrictive views of standing"); Sunstein, What 's Standing
After Lujan?, supra note 24 at 201 (discussing how Kennedy's Defenders concurrence recognized
congressional ability to articulate causes of action not found in the common law); Farber, supra note
77 at 566 n.89 (noting Kennedy demonstrated that he was receptive to recognizing public values
embodied in environmental statutes in both Lucas and Defenders).
274. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555 (1992)).
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injuries and chains of causation sufficient for standing.275 Although he
has raised questions about civil penalties in citizen suits as possibly
unconstitutionally interfering with the Executive's Article II
prerogatives, 276 he seems largely committed to allowing both landowners
and citizen enforcers to have their day in court.277
B. States' Rights Federalism
Justice Kennedy's interest in federalism is considerably greater than
his interest in environmental protection.2 78 But, his record is a mixed
one. His early concurrence in Gade supplied the deciding vote to
preempt an Illinois hazardous waste-worker training statute, apparently
viewing the avoidance of dual regulation as a higher priority than
preserving state police power. 279 This concurrence advocated a broader
preemption-based on the text of the statute-than the conflict
preemption endorsed by Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion.28 °
Similarly, Kennedy's majority opinion in Locke preempted Washington
state tanker safety regulations not on the281
basis of federal-state conflicts
but on his interpretation of federal policy.

Kennedy's first environmental law decision for the Court, Carbone,
was also surprising for a professed states' rights advocate.2 82 He viewed
the town of Clarkstown's ordinance, aimed at promoting recycling, as a
protectionist measure that interfered with the flow of interstate
commerce, not as a measure aimed at managing the town's waste
problems.2 83 This perception led this professed states' rights defender to
conclude that the local recycling ordinance substantially interfered with
his expansive notion of the dormant federal commerce power.2 84
275. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing Defenders, 504 U.S. 555).
276, See supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000)).
277, See supra notes 71-73, 178, and accompanying text (discussing Defenders, 504 U.S. 555,
and Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001)).
278, See supra note 20 (discussing the Rehnquist Court's limitations on the federal commerce
power and the Eleventh Amendment revolution during the mid-I 990s).
279. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 79.
281. See supra notes 161-171.
282. See supra note 19 (states' rights advocate), notes 81-86 and accompanying text (discussing
C & A Carbone,Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994)).
283. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 86.
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These surprising decisions favoring federal hegemony stand in
contrast to the more prototypical Kennedy states' rights position
exemplified in his 1997 Coeur d'Alene Tribe majority opinion, in which
he broadly interpreted state immunity from suits and read narrowly an
apparently relevant exemption from this liability.2 85 His endorsement of
case-by-case balancing concerning the applicability of state Eleventh
Amendment immunity from federal suits was not shared by Justice
O'Connor, who thought that federal jurisdiction should not be premised
on judicial balancing of federal versus state interests in suits seeking
prospective relief.286 Kennedy's unsympathetic approach to tribal
property issues was again evident two years later, when his opinion for
the Court rejected the Southern Ute Tribe's claim to coalbed methane
gas reserves.2 87 In so doing, he ignored interpretative rules favoring
tribes and federal retention of public resources in favor of what he
viewed as a "natural interpretation" of the definition of coal from ninety
years earlier.288 And, Kennedy's states' rights perspective dominated the
only environmental dissent he wrote, as he overlooked the text of the
Clean Air Act and deference to the EPA's interpretation of the statute in
favor of9promoting his vision of an active state role in environmental
policy.

28

Kennedy's states' rights federalism is certainly a hallmark of his
jurisprudence, 290 but his states'-rights philosophy has clear bounds. He is

285. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997), discussed supra notes 87-100
and accompanying text.
286. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
287. Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865 (1999), discussed supra notes 130137 and accompanying text. While Amoco does not directly address states' rights, it nonetheless
reflects Kennedy's attitudes toward federalism. Although not parties to the suit, western states stood
to lose considerable tax revenue if the Tenth Circuit's holding in favor of the tribe was upheld. The
states of Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming submitted an amicus brief to
the Court in support of the oil company, emphasizing the hardship the states would experience if
they were to lose tax revenue collected from the oil companies. Brief for the State of Mont. et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 16, Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865
(1999) (1999 WL 115533).
288. See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
289. Alaska Dep't of Envtl Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004), discussed supra notes
187-203 and accompanying text.
290. Among Kennedy's states'-rights contributions was his deciding vote in United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), a non-environmental decision striking down the federal Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 as beyond the power of the Commerce Clause, the first time in sixty
years the Court found a federal statute to exceed the commerce power. Kennedy's concurrence
(joined by Justice O'Connor) emphasized that gun possession lacked commercial character and that
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more than willing to preempt state statutes, even where they do not
directly conflict with federal law. 291 And, his broad interpretation of the
dormant Commerce Clause allowed him to strike down a recycling
ordinance as protectionist in Carbone, even though the restrictions
imposed by the ordinance were felt more in-state than out-of-state.29 2 On
the other hand, Kennedy's states' rights pedigree was evident in his
expansive view of state immunity from federal suit in Coeur d'Alene
Tribe.293 He also overlooked both federal land and Indian law canons of
interpretation in rejecting the Southern Ute Tribe's claims to coalbed
methane gas, in an anti-federal, if not a states' rights opinion. 94 And, his
interpretation of the Clean Air Act would have effectively allowed a
state to displace federal action.295 So, although Kennedy is a cardcarrying member of the states' rights club, he has shown a proclivity to
dispense with state police power where not doing so might produce dual
regulation.
C. Takings
The aggressiveness evident in Justice Kennedy's standing and
federalism opinions is not very apparent in his approach to takings,
which instead has been characterized by moderation. In Lucas, he
refused to join Justice Scalia's effort to erect a significant categorical
takings rule, opting instead in a concurrence for a litmus test grounded
on reasonable landowner expectations that could account for changed
conditions, new ecological understandings, and protection of what he
termed

"fragile

lands.,

296

This sort

of fact-intensive

inquiry

is

characteristic of Kennedy's takings jurisprudence.29 7

neither the purposes nor the design of the statute had a "commercial nexus." Id. at 580.
291. See supra notes 161-171 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Locke, 529
U.S. 89 (2001)).
292. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's opinion in C & A
Carbone,Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994)).
293. See supra notes 88-100 and accompanying text (discussing Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of
Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997)).
294. See supra notes 124-137 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's opinion in Amoco
Prod.Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865 (1999)).

295. See supra note 194-203 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's dissent in Alaska
Dep't ofEnvtl Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004)).
296. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), discussed supra notes 54-65 and

accompanying text.
297. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's affinity for fact-specific
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A fidelity to factual analysis also helps to explain Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in Eastern Enterprises, in which he refused to apply a
takings analysis concerning apparently retroactive legislation, choosing
instead to conclude that the statute failed to satisfy substantive due
process. 298 Kennedy reiterated his desire to employ substantive due
process analysis in his Lingle concurrence. 299 This willingness to employ
substantive due process to review the wisdom of legislation echoed the
distrust of Congress reflected in his suggestion in Laidlaw that
congressionally authorized civil penalties in citizen suits might intrude
on the Executive's Article II powers.3 °0
Kennedy's interest in ensuring that landowners get their day in court
motivated his ripeness ruling in Palazzolo,30 1 when he eliminated the so-

called "notice rule" that gave governments a categorical defense against
takings claims, referring to the government as Hobbesian.3 °2 He also
approved jury determinations of takings claims in Del Monte Dunes,
while refusing to apply a "rough proportionality" test outside the
exactions area.3 3

Another Kennedy concurrence supplied the decisive vote in Kelo,
ratifying public use takings for economic development.30 4 But, he
objected to the plurality's call for great judicial deference to the city's
redevelopment plan, calling for a "careful and extensive inquiry" to

analysis).
298. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 549 (1998), discussed supra notes 104-106 and
accompanying text.
299. Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 548-49 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see supra note
223 and accompanying text.
300. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 197 (2000) (Kennedy,
J., concurring); see supranotes 159-160 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 172-186 and accompanying text.
302. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001); see supra note 179 and accompanying
text. Thomas Hobbes was an English philosopher who wrote Leviathan in 1651, which suggests that
man may avoid destructive wars through social contracts that establish governments as absolute
authorities. According to the Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, Hobbesian refers to the theory
that "absolutism in government is necessary to prevent the warfare of each against all to which
natural selfishness inevitably leads mankind." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 544

(1973).
303. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1998); see supra
notes 107-122 and accompanying text.
304. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 82:667, 2007

ensure that the public benefits were substantial and the private benefits
incidental.3 °5 This sort of fact-based scrutiny is, of course, familiar.30 6
Kennedy's commitment to contextualism is quite evident in the
takings cases. In Lucas, he opposed categorical decisionmaking because
it was not sensitive to changes in ecological understandings and fragile
lands.30 7 Factual analysis was also central to his acceptance of eminent
domain for economic development 30 8 and for determining whether a
regulation "substantively advance[d]" a public purpose, a test he
convinced the Court was more appropriate for substantive due process
than takings analysis. 30 9 He also wrote the Court's opinion approving
juries as determiners of whether the application of a regulation to a
property produces a taking.31 0 On the other hand, Kennedy refused to
approve a categorical taking rule in Del Monte Dunes,311 and his
conception of the scope of the exception to the categorical rule created in
Lucas was much more expansive than Justice Scalia's. 312 Thus, while
Kennedy may sympathize with the Lockean landowner confronted by
the Hobbesian state,31 3 he is unwilling to side with the landowner
categorically.
D. Environmental Statutory Interpretation
Justice Kennedy's review of environmental legislation is probably
best characterized as indifferent. He has written only a couple of
influential opinions: his sole environmental dissent and the deciding
opinion in the 2006 wetlands case. In Alaska Department of

305. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
306. See, e.g., supra notes 246-254, infra notes 307-310, 318 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (discussing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).
308. See supra notes 235-237 and accompanying text (discussing Kelo, 545 U.S. 469).
309. See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text (discussing E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S.
498 (1998)), notes 215-226 and accompanying text (discussing Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528
(2005)).
310. See supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text (discussing City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1998)).
311. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (rejecting application of the Dolan "rough
proportionality" rule).
312. See supra notes 58 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's concurrence in Lucas, 505
U.S. 1003).
313. See supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's opinion in Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001)).
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Environmental Conservation, Kennedy's dissent objected to the federal
EPA effectively overturning the state's interpretation of "best available
control technology" under the Clean Air Act. 314 He seemed especially
concerned that under the EPA's--and the majority's--interpretation,
both the federal and state governments could actively enforce the statute
simultaneously, inconsistent with his understanding of cooperative
federalism. 31 5 But because simultaneous enforcement by the federal and
state governments has long characterized implementation of
environmental statutes like the Clean Air Act,3 16 Kennedy's complaint
seemed more appropriate for a legislator than a judge.
The wetlands case, Rapanos, concerning the scope of Clean Water
Act jurisdiction, appeared to animate Justice Kennedy, who again
supplied the pivotal vote.317 Quite predictably, although he thought the
Corps of Engineers' regulations were overbroad, his solution was
individualized fact-finding to establish a "significant nexus" between the
wetland at issue and navigable waters.31 8 Although this search may
impose considerable administrative burdens on the regulatory agencies,
the workability of Kennedy's nexus requirement was not his concern.
Although there are not many Kennedy environmental statutory
interpretations, those that exist reinforce Kennedy's commitment to state
autonomy, which is clearly more important to him than administrative
deference or environmental protection. 31 9 Also reinforced was perhaps
the overarching theme of Kennedy's jurisprudence: a commitment to
judicial factual inquiry in the form of a search for nexus.32 °

314. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 502-03 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
315. See supra notes 194-197 and accompanying text.
316. See, e.g., Joel Mintz, The Future of Environmental Enforcement: A Reply to Paddock, 21

ENVTL. L. 1543 (1991) (arguing that federal-state enforcement provisions will continue to rely on
federal enforcement); Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The
Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 719, 777 (2006)
(discussing the ways in which the Supreme Court has narrowed enforcement of federal
environmental laws in recent years).
317. See supra notes 247, 251, 254 and accompanying text (discussing Rapanos v. United States,
-U.S.- (June 19, 2006), 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2236 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)).
318. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2248-50.
319. See supra notes 194-203 and accompanying text (discussing Alaska Dep't of Envtl.
Conservation, 540 U.S. 461 (2004)).
320. See supra notes 246-254 and accompanying text (discussing Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. 2208).
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CONCLUSION
This study reveals Justice Anthony Kennedy to be a jurist skeptical of
sweeping doctrinal changes and attached to incremental case-by-case
decisionmaking, in which judges are entrusted with balancing tests and
charged with explaining the connection between doctrine and context.
Kennedy may be a doctrinal minimalist, but he is not a judicial
minimalist: he possesses considerable faith in the judiciary's ability to
balance factors like environmental protection, economic profit, and
individual liberty.
Kennedy's willingness to entertain nexus theories of citizen standing
and his acknowledgment of congressionally-created standing 321 reflect
his commitment to judicial decisionmaking, although he has questioned
the constitutionality of citizen suits under Article 11.322 On the other
hand, he is impatient with government allegations that landowners'
takings claims are not ripe.323 He is eager for takings claimants to have
324
their day in court, and he is willing to have juries decide takings cases.
Kennedy's devotion to case-by-case balancing was evident in his
rejection of the "notice rule," which had given government defendants in
takings cases a categorical defense prior to his Palazzolo opinion. 325 He
was also skeptical of the breadth of the categorical takings doctrine
Justice Scalia announced in Lucas. Kennedy instead called for a broad
exception to categorical takings that would consider contextual factors
like changed conditions and sensitive lands. 326 Such factors can also be
balanced in substantive due process analysis, which Kennedy has sought
to revive as a partial antidote to an expanded takings doctrine.327

321. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's concurrence in Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)).
322. See supra notes 159-160 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's concurrence in
Friends of the Earth,Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000)).
323. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (discussing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
606 (2001)).
324. See supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's majority opinion in
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1998), upholding the lower
court's decision to submit a takings claim to a jury).
325. See supra notes 179-181 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's rejection of the
"notice rule" barring takings claims where a landowner acquired the property after the restrictive

rule was in place as sufficient to defeat a takings claim in Palazzolo).
326. See supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's concurrence in Lucas
v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).

327. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's concurrence in E
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Kennedy is a determined states' rights enthusiast, a vital participant in
the Rehnquist Court's federalism revolution. 8 He rejected Indian tribal
land claims in favor of a broad application of state sovereign immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment, 329 and the only environmental dissent
he has written was the product of his fidelity to states' rights: Kennedy
thought that the federal EPA should not overrule the state of Alaska's
regulatory decisions, despite statutory text apparently authorizing just
that.33 ° Yet his Carbone decision showed him willing to invalidate a
local recycling ordinance on Commerce Clause grounds, 331 and he was
quick to preempt Washington tanker safety and Illinois hazardous waste
worker training laws.332 Kennedy's devotion to states' rights apparently
does not extend to what he considers to be overregulation: while he
prefers state regulation to federal regulation, he prefers one level of
regulation to two, and the market to regulation. His states' rights
advocacy may actually be part of a larger deregulatory preference.
But, while Kennedy favors less regulation, he is not interested in
dismantling all regulation. That is clear from his pivotal Rapanos
concurrence, where he refused to agree with the plurality's effort to
categorically scale back Clean Water Act jurisdiction, instead (and quite
characteristically) opting for case-by-case determinations of the
relationship between wetlands and navigable waters.333 He also approved
economic development condemnations in his deciding Kelo concurrence,
although characteristically he would have established a detailed fact-

Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998), suggesting a revival of substantive due process analysis for
evaluating retroactive legislation, rather than the takings clause) and supra notes 223-224 and
accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's concurrence in Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S 528 (2005),
again articulating a willingness to revive substantive due process review).
328. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (discussing the Rehnquist Court's federalism
revolution).
329. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's opinion refusing to
apply the Ex parte Young exception to allow a suit filed by the Coeur d'Alene Tribe's to proceed
against the state of Idaho).
330. See supra notes 194-203 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's dissent in Alaska
Dep't ofEnvtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004)).

331. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text (discussing the decision in C & A Carbone v.
Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994)).

332. See supra notes 164-171 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's decision in United
States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000)), notes 78-80 (discussing Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt.
Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992)).
333. See supra notes 247-254 and accompanying text (discussing the concurrence in Rapanos v.
United States, -U.S.
(June 19, 2006), 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006)).
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based inquiry to ascertain that the condemnation
was not for
334
impermissible private gain without public benefit.
Whether Justice Kennedy's recent endorsement of environmental
regulation is indicative of a trend is hardly clear. But, as long ago as
1992, he was fashioning rules to protect sensitive lands and to account
for unforeseen changes. 335 He is certainly not as sensitive to
environmental protection as he is to fact-based decisionmaking, states'
rights, or minimal regulation. 336 But, he is not reflexively anti-regulation.
Because of his devotion to private property rights,3 37 perhaps the best
way to characterize Justice Kennedy is as someone who, while not
dismissive of environmental regulation, will subject it to hard-look
judicial review. The architects of hard-look review would not likely have
anticipated its application against environmental regulation,33 8 but that
may well portend its future in the Roberts Court.
At the end of the day, Justice Kennedy seems to be Holmesian in
several respects. Like Justice Holmes, 339 he is a devoted case-by-case

334. See supra notes 234-237 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's concurrence in Kelo
v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)).
335. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's concurrence in Lucas
v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), which recognized that changed conditions and
ecological concerns may frustrate some takings claims and justify land use regulations).
336. See Cannon, supra note 7 (noting that Kennedy voted for the position benefiting the
environment just 34.1 percent of the time in environmental cases).
337. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing extrajudicial remarks Kennedy has
made in support of private property rights).
338. Hard-look judicial review emerged during the 1970s when the D.C. Circuit, in response to a
substantial increase in administrative law cases, began to emphasize review of the substance of
agency decisions, not merely the procedure. See Reuel Schiller, Rulemaking's Promise:
Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139, 1156
(2001) (describing the advent of hard-look review in D.C. Circuit Judge Leventhal's opinion in
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970)); see also Harold
Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmakingand the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PENN. L. REv. 509,
555 (1974) (advocating that courts subject federal agency environmental decisions to "hard look" in
order to ensure "the principled integration and balanced assessment of both environmental and
nonenvironmental considerations in federal agency decisionmaking"); Abraham Chayes, The Role
of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1284 (1976) (discussing the
emergence of "public law litigation"-civil disputes over constitutional or statutory questions,
rather than private party litigation-and the development of a more active judicial role in such
cases).
339. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457,467 (1897) ("I
think that the judges themselves have failed adequately to recognize their duty of weighing
considerations of social advantage. The duty is inevitable, and the result of the often proclaimed
judicial aversion to deal with such considerations is simply to leave the very ground and foundations
of judgments inarticulate, and often unconscious ....
").See also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
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balancer. He is also skeptical of regulatory improvement, 340 but he is
largely unwilling to impede regulatory innovation. And, like Holmes, he
is relatively non-ideological, except that his commitment to states' rights
is quite un-Holmesian, making Kennedy's jurisprudence appear much
more activistic than Holmes's call for judicial restraint.3 4' Still, when
Holmes wrote, "the life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience" as a critique of Christopher Columbus Langdell's
jurisprudence, 342 he could have been describing Justice Kennedy's
attitude toward Justice Scalia. Holmes's critique may very well help
explain the divide between the two justices. How this divide--between
Scalia's
categorical
distinctions
and
Kennedy's
fact-based
343
consequentialism -- plays out may well characterize the nature of the
environmental jurisprudence that the Roberts Court has begun to create.

TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 131 (1992) (attributing to Holmes' article,
Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894), the first "fully articulated balancing test [in]
American legal theory," marking "the beginning of modernism in American legal thought" and "the
demise of the late-nineteenth-century system of legal formalism.").
340. On Holmes's skepticism, see Yosal Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes. A Dissenting Opinion, 15
STAN. L. REV. 3 (1962-1963).
341. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("This case
is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain. If it were a
question whether I agreed with that theory, I should desire to study it further and long before
making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my
agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their opinions
in law."). On Holmes's commitment to judicial restraint and to majoritariansim, see G. EDWARD
WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 327-30, 343,363,391,487
(1993).
342. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). Holmes referred to Langdell,
the Harvard Law School Dean and founder of the casebook method of legal instruction, as "the
greatest living legal theologian." Book Notices, 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880) (reviewing
CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1880));
see also KERMIT L. HALL, ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS 339 (2d ed.
1996) (attributing the review of Langdell's casebook to Holmes).
343. Kennedy, like Justice O'Connor, might be described as a Burkean minimalist. See Cass R.
Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 356-59 (2006) (describing Burkean
minimalists as adherents to incrementalism and established traditions on pragmatic and
consequentialist grounds, and including Justices O'Connor and Frankfurter among the practitioners
of Burkean minimalism).
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APPENDIX A:
Supreme Court Environmental Decisions 1989-2007344
Year
1989

Case name
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.

Citation
491 U.S. 1

Kennedy's role
Joined in both
Justice White's
and Justice
Scalia's partial
dissents from the
5-4 decision

1989

Brendale v. Confederated Tribes
& Bands of Yakima Indian
Nation

492 U.S. 408

Joined majority

1989

Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council

490 U.S. 332

1989

Marsh v. Oregon Natural
Resources Council

490 U.S. 360

1989

Cotton Petroleum Corp v. New
Mexico
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County
New Orleans Public Service,

490 U.S. 163

Joined
unanimous
majority
Joined
unanimous
majority
Joined majority

493 U.S. 20
491 U.S. 350

Joined majority
Joined majority

1989
1989
1990

Inc. v. Council of New Orleans

_

General Motors Corp. v. United

496 U.S. 530

Joined majority

States

344. This case table includes environmental decisions issued by the Court during Kennedy's
tenure. Case names which appear in boldface type indicate decisions in which Kennedy wrote an
opinion. Although the overall vote count was not included for each decision, the table does note
which cases which were decided with a slim five-member majority. A small number of cases
included in the tabular data indicate Kennedy wrote an opinion for the case, but are not discussed in
the article text. These decisions are marked with an *. We omitted these cases from the discussion
either because while the decision had a significant effect on environmental law, the case itself did
not involve environmental issues (United States v. Lopez; City of Bourne v. Flores), or because the
decision involved an original jurisdiction state boundary dispute (Louisianav. Mississippi;Alaska v.
United States).

Justice Kennedy and the Environment

Year
1990

Case name
California v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission

Citation
495 U.S. 490

1990

Lujan v. National Wildlife

497 U.S. 871

Federation

1991

Kennedy's role
Joined
unanimous
majority
Joined 5-4
majority

501 U.S. 597

Joined majority

1991

Wisconsin Public Intervenor v.
Mortier
Illinois v. Kentucky

500 U.S. 380

1991

Oklahoma v. New Mexico

501 U.S. 221

Joined
unanimous
majority
Joined parts of
the majority
opinion and also
Chief Justice
Rehnquist's
partial
concurrence and
dissent

1992

Chemical Waste Management v.
Hunt
Arkansas v. Oklahoma

504 U.S. 334

Joined majority

503 U.S. 91

503 U.S. 607

1992

United States Department of
Energy v. Ohio
City of Burlington v. Dague

Joined
unanimous
majority
Joined majority

505 U.S. 557

Joined majority

1992

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife

504 U.S. 555

1992

Robertson v. Seattle Audubon
Society

503 U.S. 429

Wrote opinion
concurring in
part and
concurring in the
judgment
Joined
unanimous

1992

1992

majority

1992

Gade v. National Solid Waste
Management Association

505 U.S. 88

Wrote 5-4
concurrence

Washington Law Review

Vol. 82:667, 2007

Year
1992

Case name
Mississippi v. Louisana

Citation
506 U.S. 73

1992
1992
1992

Wyoming v. Oklahoma
New York v. United States
United States v. Alaska

502 U.S. 437
505 U.S. 144
503 U.S. 569

1992

Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill,
Inc. v. Michigan Department of
Natural Resources
Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council
Yee v. City of Escondido
South Dakota v. Bourland
Nebraska v. Wyoming

504 U.S. 353

1992
1992
1993
1993

505 U.S.
1003
503 U.S. 519
508 U.S. 679
507 U.S. 584

Kennedy's role
Joined
unanimous
majority
Joined majority
Joined majority
Joined
unanimous
majority
Joined majority

Wrote
concurrence
Joined majority
Joined majority
Joined
unanimous
majority

1994
1994

Key Tronic Corp. v. United
States
C & A Carbone, Inc v. Town

511 U.S. 809

Joined majority

511 U.S. 383

Wrote 6-3

of Clarkstown

1994

Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v.
Oregon Department of
Environmental Quality
Jefferson County PUD No. 1 v.
Washington Department of

majority

511 U.S. 93

Joined majority

511 U.S. 700

Joined majority

511 U.S. 328

Joined majority

1994

City of Chicago v.
Environmental Defense
Dolan v. City of Tigard

512 U.S. 374

1995

United States v. Lopez*

514 U.S. 549

Joined 5-4
majority
Concurred in 5-4
majority opinion
but wrote
separate
concurrence

1994

Ecology

1994

Justice Kennedy and the Environment
Year
1995

Citation
515 U.S. 687

Kennedy's role
Joined majority

1995

Case name
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter
of Communities for a Great
Oregon
Louisiana v. Mississippi*

516 U.S. 22

Wrote
unanimous

1995

Kansas v. Colorado

514 U.S. 673

1995
1996

Nebraska v. Wyoming
Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc.

515 U.S. 1
517 U.S. 44

Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor
Bennett v. Spear

521 U.S. 591

Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe
of Idaho
United States v. Alaska
Suitum v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency
Babbitt v. Youpee
City of Boerne v. Flores*
United States v. Bestfoods

521 U.S. 261

1998

South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux
Tribe

522 U.S. 39

1998

Alaska v. Native Village of
Venetie Tribal Government

522 U.S. 520

1998

New Jersey v. New York

523 U.S. 767

majority

1996

1997
1997

1997
1997
1997
1997
1997
1998

516 U.S. 479

520 U.S. 154

521 U.S. 1
520 U.S. 725
519 U.S. 234
521 U.S. 507
524 U.S. 51

Joined
unanimous
majority
Joined majority
Joined 5-4
majority
Joined
unanimous
majority
Joined majority
Joined
unanimous
majority
Wrote 5-4
majority
Joined majority
Joined majority
Joined majority
Wrote majority
Joined
unanimous
majority
Joined
unanimous
majority
Joined
unanimous
majority
Joined majority
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Year
1998

Case name
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Environment

Citation
523 U.S. 83

1998

Ohio Forestry Association Inc.
v. Sierra Club

523 U.S. 726

1998

Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel

524 U.S. 498

1999

Amoco Production Co. v.
Southern Ute Indian Tribe
City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes at Monterey Ltd.

526 U.S. 865

2000

United States v. Locke

529 U.S. 89

2000

Friends of the Earth, Inc v.
Laidlaw Environmental
Services, Inc.
Whitman v. American Trucking
Associations, Inc.
Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook County v. U.S. Army

528 U.S. 167

1999

2001
2001

Corps of Engineers

526 U.S. 687

Kennedy's role
Joined majority
and Justice
O'Connor's
concurrence
Joined
unanimous
majority
Wrote opinion
concurring with
4-member
plurality's
judgment and
dissented in part
Wrote majority
Wrote
unanimous
decision with
respect to certain
parts of the
opinion and a 54 majority with
respect to other
parts
Wrote
unanimous
opinion
Wrote
concurrence

531 U.S. 457

Joined majority

531 U.S. 159

Joined 5-4
majority

Justice Kennedy and the Environment
Year
2001

Case name
Idaho v. United States

Citation
533 U.S. 262

2001

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island

533 U.S. 606

2002

Borden Ranch Partnership v.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

537 U.S. 99

2004

Alaska Department of
Environmental Conservation
v. EPA
Engine Manufacturing
Association v. South Coast Air

540 U.S. 461

2004

541 U.S. 246

Kennedy's role
Joined Chief
Justice
Rehnquist's
dissent from a 54 decision
Wrote 5-4
majority
Did not take part
in the 4-4
decision
Wrote dissent
from 5-4
decision
Joined majority

543 U.S. 157

Joined majority

541 U.S. 95

Joined majority

Joined
unanimous

Quality Management District

2004
2004

Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall
Services, Inc.
South Florida Water
Management v. Miccosukee
Tribe

2004

U.S. Department of
Transportation v. Public Citizen

541 U.S. 752

2004

Norton v. Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance

542 U.S. 55

2004

BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United
States
Alaska v. United States*

541 U.S. 176

majority

2005

545 U.S. 75

Joined
unanimous
majority
Joined majority
Wrote
unanimous
majority in part
and majority
with respect to
other parts of
opinion
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Year
2005

Case name
Kelo v. City of New London

Citation
545 U.S. 469

2005

Lingle v. Chevron

544 U.S. 528

2006

S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board
of Environmental Protection

2006

Rapanos v. U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers

2007

Massachusetts v. Environmental
Protection Agency

2007

Environmental Defense v. Duke
Energy Corp.

2007

United States v. Atlantic
Research Corp.

547 U.S. __,
(May 15,
2006) 126 S.
Ct. 1843
(2006)
__U.S.(June 19,
2006), 126 S.
Ct. 2208
(2006)
__U.S._
(April 2,
2007), 127 S.
Ct. 1438
(2007)
_U.S._
(April 2,
2007), 127 S.
Ct. 1423
(2007)
__U.S.(June 11,
2007), 127 S.
Ct. 2331
(2007)

Kennedy's role
Wrote
concurrence to 54 decision

Wrote
concurrence to a
unanimous
decision
Joined majority

Wrote an opinion
concurring with
the 4-member
plurality's
judgment
Joined 5-4
majority

Joined majority

Joined
unanimous
majority

